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Judges must be wise. Sound judicial reasoning requires moral
virtue. These sentiments about judging have been lost.' They
apparently belong to a bygone era. While many advocate self-
restraint or prudence as judicial virtues,2 moral virtue has been
conspicuously absent from the list. Except for avoiding obvious vices
such as bribery, favoritism, prejudice, sloth, and arbitrariness,
conventional wisdom maintains that being a good judge does not
require being a good person. Even theorists sympathetic to a
relationship between law and morality balk at making moral virtue a
prerequisite of judicial decision making.' Rather, many contend that
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1. Cf. ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION 2 (1993) (describing a spiritual crisis in the legal profession due to the loss of the
ideal lawyer-statesman who strives not to be a technician but to become a person of practical
wisdom).
2. See, e.g., David Luban, Justice Holmes and Judicial Virtue, in VIRTUE: NOMOS XXXIV
235, 242-56 (John W. Chapman & William A. Galston eds., 1992) (summarizing and criticizing
Justice Holmes's philosophical justification of self-restraint as a judicial virtue) [hereinafter
VIRTUE]; Terry Pinkard, Judicial Virtue and Democratic Politics, in VIRTUE, supra, at 265, 281-
82 (criticizing legal realist and majoritarian premises supporting Holmesian self-restraint);
Judith N. Shklar, Justice Without Virtue, in VIRTUE, supra, at 283, 286-88. Although
recognizing that judges need to abstain from certain moral vices, Shklar argues that prudence
rather than rationality is the guiding virtue of judges, which involves judges being
"democratically patient and politically skilled enough to convince their fellow citizens that they
are doing a fair and honest, though not a flawless job." Id. at 287-88.
3. Ronald Dworkin claims that "[m]ost cases at law-even most constitutional cases-are
not hard cases. The ordinary craft of a judge dictates an answer and leaves no room for the
play of personal moral conviction." RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW: THE MORAL
READING OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 11 (1996). Dworkin argues further that
"constitutional clauses are moral principles that must be applied through the exercise of moral
judgment." Id. at 6. However, constitutional interpretation is basically a question of "how an
249
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judicial decision making is a matter of technical reasoning. On this
view, judicial reasoning involves reasoning correctly either about the
applicable legal rules or principles or about how the decision
achieves an aim or end like economic efficiency.' It is an art or a craft
rather than a moral enterprise. Still others argue that reason, even
with the help of moral virtue, cannot explain judicial decision making
but that we must deconstruct judges' reasoning to determine what
hidden presuppositions are guiding it such as presuppositions linked
to race, gender, or class.5 On this account, judicial decision making is
a matter of politics, not morality.
Aristotle, however, contends that judges must possess the moral
virtue of corrective justice and the intellectual virtue of practical
wisdom in order to determine the just result in all cases. Despite the
widespread inattention to this claim, Aristotle's discussion of justice
in Book V of the Nicomachean Ethics has had an extraordinary
impact on the history of philosophy of law and legal theory.
Aristotle's discussion of a particular form of justice, corrective
justice, has been generally thought to mark the beginning of the
abstract moral principle is best understood" in the context of a particular legal dispute. Id. at 2.
"Judges may not read their own convictions into the Constitution. They may not read the
abstract moral clauses as expressing any particular moral judgment, no matter how much that
judgment appeals to them, unless they find it consistent in principle with the structural design
of the Constitution as a whole, and also with the dominant lines of past constitutional
interpretation by other judges. They must regard themselves as partners with other officials,
past and future, who together elaborate a coherent constitutional morality, and they must take
care to see that what they contribute fits with the rest." Id. at 10.
4. Richard Posner argues that "j]udges have got to understand that the only sound basis
for a legal rule is its social advantage, which requires an economic judgment, balancing benefits
against costs." RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY
208 (1999). He further claims that "[m]ost economic analysis of law is pragmatic," id. at 239,
and argues that "pragmatist judges always try to do the best they can do for the present and the
future, unchecked by any felt duty to secure consistency in principle with what other officials
have done in the past," id. at 241. Posner's legal pragmatism, however, is not the same as
philosophical pragmatism; it is entirely consistent with resorting to the technical reasoning
employed by the economic analysis of law.
5. Roberto Unger argues that the critical legal studies movement rejects the claims that
law and morality can be based on an apolitical method or procedure of justification and that
the legal system can be objectively defended as embodying an intelligible moral order. The
legal order is merely the outcome of power struggles or practical compromises. Thus, he
advocates "the purely instrumental use of legal practice and legal doctrine to advance leftist
aims." Roberto M. Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARV. L. REV. 563, 567
(1983). For a good introduction to critical legal studies, see MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO
CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES (1987). Similarly, Robin West claims that masculine jurisprudence
proceeds from the presupposition of individuals as essentially separate from one another
("separation thesis") while feminist jurisprudence proceeds from the presupposition that
individuals are essentially connected or related to one another. See Robin West, Jurisprudence
and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1988), reprinted in FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY (Katharine T.
Bartlett & Rosanne Kennedy eds., 1991). Finally, critical race theorists have tried to show that
"areas of law ostensibly designed for our benefit often benefit whites even more than blacks."
Richard Delgado, Brewer's Plea: Critical Thoughts on Common Sense, 44 VAND. L. REV. 1, 6
(1991). See also Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Critical Race Theory: An Annotated
Bibliography, 79 VA. L. REV. 461 (1993).
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philosophical examination of tort law.6 This influence has not only
been important historically but also continues to have significant
influence on legal scholars today.' Many scholars consider corrective
justice, of one form or another, the main normative alternative to the
economic analysis of law for explaining not only tort law' but also
other areas of private law9 and law in general. ' ° Several legal theorists
have developed new or modified versions of corrective justice to
explain private law adjudication." Others have taken Aristotle's
notion of corrective justice as central to their theories about private
law or tort law.2 For example, Ernest Weinrib claims that "private
law was Aristotle's discovery" and that "[c]orrective justice is the
normative structure that underlies the private law relationship."'3
According to Aristotle's corrective justice understanding of legal
adjudication, the judge is required to look only at the distinctive
character of the alleged injury rather than at the virtue of the
6. See David G. OWEN, Foreword: Why Philosophy Matters to Tort Law, in
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW 1 (David G. Owen ed., 1995) [hereinafter
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS].
7. Two recent collections of articles include the leading scholars of corrective justice
theories. See PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS, supra note 6; Symposium: Corrective Justice and
Formalism, The Care One Owes One's Neighbors, 77 IOWA L. REV. 403 (1992).
8. See, e.g., Stephen R. Perry, The Moral Foundations of Tort Law, 77 IOWA L. REV. 449
(1992).
9. Private law is "[tihat portion of the law which defines, regulates, enforces, and
administers relationships among individuals, associations, and corporations." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1196 (6th ed. 1990). By contrast, public law is "[tihat portion of the law that
defines rights and duties with either the operation of government, or the relationships between
the government and individuals, associations, and corporations." Id. at 1230.
10. See, e.g., Richard W. Wright, Right, Justice, and Tort Law, in PHILOSOPHICAL
FOUNDATIONS, supra note 6, at 160 ("I believe it is clear that the equal freedom theory
[Kantian-Aristotelian theory of right or justice], rather than the utilitarian efficiency theory,
provides the foundation for morality and law in general and for tort law in particular.").
11. See, e.g., JULES L. COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS 303-28 (1992); Jules L. Coleman,
The Practice of Corrective Justice, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS, supra note 6, at 53
("[C]orrective justice is the principle that those who are responsible for the wrongful losses of
others have a duty to repair them, and that the core of tort law embodies this conception of
corrective justice."); Jules L. Coleman, The Mixed Conception of Corrective Justice, 77 IOWA L.
REV. 427, 444 (1992) [hereinafter Coleman, The Mixed Conception]; Richard A. Epstein,
Nuisance Law: Corrective Justice and Its Utilitarian Constraints, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 49 (1979)
(arguing that substantive corrective justice is developed based on the principle of causal
responsibility); George P. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. REV. 537,
538 (1972) (arguing that the paradigm of reciprocity is derived from the "intuitions of
corrective justice"); Gary T. Schwartz, Mixed Theories of Tort Law: Affirming Both Deterrence
and Corrective Justice, 75 TEx. L. REV. 1801 (1997).
12. See ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW 56 (1995) [hereinafter WEINRIB,
PRIVATE LAW]; Ernest J. Weinrib, Corrective Justice, 77 IOWA L. REV. 403 (1992) [hereinafter
Weinrib, Corrective Justice]. See also James Gordley, Tort Law in the Aristotelian Tradition, in
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS, supra note 6, at 131; Steven J. Heyman, Aristotle on Political
Justice, 77 IOWA L. REV. 851 (1992); Wright, supra note 10; Richard W. Wright, Substantive
Corrective Justice, 77 IOWA L. REV. 625 (1992) [hereinafter Wright, Substantive Corrective
Justice].
13. Weinrib, Corrective Justice, supra note 12, at 425; see also WEINRIB, PRIVATE LAW,
supra note 12, at 56-57.
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disputing parties. She must treat the parties equally and decide which
party inflicted the wrong or injury and which received it. This
requires a determination of the position of equality (i.e., legal rights)
of the parties before the injury occurred. In accordance with the
position of equality, the judge determines if there has been any
unjust gain or loss and, if so, equalizes it. Consequently, corrective
justice (the position of equality) is the mean between the two
excesses of unjust gain and loss and provides a standard for judges to
evaluate unjust gains and losses.
In general, this picture of judicial decision making hardly appears
controversial and seems to reveal the structure of private law
adjudication. It suggests that a judge looks backward (ex post) to the
time of the alleged injury to determine whether there was an injury
and if so, whether it was caused by the wrongful conduct of the
defendant. Without getting into the conundrums of causation, the
central idea is that the judge must determine whether the
defendant's actions caused an unjust injury to the plaintiff which
must then be corrected or equalized by compensating the plaintiff.4
The central problem I will focus on, however, is whether or how
corrective justice provides a standard or a method for determining
whether there was an injury (an unjust gain or loss). My thesis is that
the moral virtue of corrective justice receives its content, as all the
moral virtues do, through judges exercising the intellectual virtue of
practical wisdom in relation to the particulars of the case and the
telos of the good life.
The issue of the content of Aristotle's theory of corrective justice
has been the subject of much debate. 5 Many interpreters of
14. Corrective justice is often characterized as adopting an ex post perspective that looks
backward in an attempt to apportion gains and losses caused by the defendants in violation of
the plaintiffs' rights. See, e.g, Richard W. Wright, Actual Causation vs. Probabilistic Linkage:
The Bane of Economic Analysis, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 435, 435-37 (1985). By contrast, the
economic analysis of law is usually characterized as an ex ante perspective. In the tort context,
the economic analysis of law minimizes or eliminates the role of causation in determining
liability and looks at liability as a means of creating efficient incentives for future behavior
rather than as a means for ex post compensation for injuries caused by the defendant. See id. at
436-37. Some have argued that the ex post corrective justice approach is incompatible with the
ex ante economic approach because they have inconsistent normative justifications for
imposing liability. See, e.g., John Borgo, Causal Paradigms in Tort Law, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 419,
454-55 (1979). However, in the conclusion, I suggest that the teleological conception of
corrective justice, when fully elaborated and properly understood, requires the practically wise
judge to combine the ex post and ex ante perspectives in judicial decision making.
15. See, e.g., HANS KELSEN, WHAT IS JUSTICE? 125-36 (1957) (criticizing corrective justice
as an empty tautology consisting of rendering each his due); WEINRIB, PRIVATE LAW, supra
note 12, at 58 (proposing a Kantian content for Aristotle's formal definition of corrective
justice: "The equality of corrective justice is the abstract equality of free purposive beings
under the Kantian concept of right"); Richard A. Posner, The Concept of Corrective Justice in
Recent Theories of Tort Law, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 187, 201, 203 (1981) (arguing that the concept
of corrective justice "is a procedural principle" that "is not only compatible with, but required
by, the economic theory of law"); Weinrib, Aristotle's Forms of Justice, 2 RATIO JURIS 211, 218
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Aristotle's theory have claimed that the notion of corrective justice
does not have any specific content. Some claim it is merely formal,
and others claim it is empty. For example, Weinrib argues that
corrective justice provides the formal structure of justification for
private law and that "the equality of corrective justice is the abstract
equality of free purposive beings under the Kantian concept of
right."16 Although rejecting Weinrib's formalism, Richard Wright
similarly claims that "the moral equality of the parties in corrective
justice seems to prefigure (through ethical presuppositions rather
than formalist conceptual implications) Kant's foundational
assumption of the 'absolute moral worth' of each individual."17
Finally, Steven Heyman argues that corrective justice is political and
that "Aristotle's doctrine of juridical equality reasonably can be
understood based on a conception of freedom" developed in
Aristotle's Politics.18
Despite the insights of these accounts of corrective justice, none of
them adequately explains how the moral virtue of corrective justice
relates to the standard reading of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics as
proposing a teleological form of ethics. By contrast, this Article
argues for a teleological 9 interpretation of Aristotle's conception of
corrective justice. The teleological conception of corrective justice
does not attempt to analyze corrective justice merely as a formal
(Weinrib), substantive (Wright), or political (Heyman) conception of
equality or freedom that can be applied by technical reason to
various circumstances. Rather, it maintains that corrective justice is a
moral virtue of the judge that cannot be fully understood without
(1989) [hereinafter Weinrib, Aristotle's Forms]; Weinrib, Corrective Justice, supra note 12, at
413, 419-21, 423; Ernest J. Weinrib, Legal Formalism: On the Immanent Rationality of Law, 97
YALE L.J. 949, 981 (1988) [hereinafter Weinrib, Legal Formalism].
16. WEINRIB, PRIVATE LAW, supra note 12, at 58.
17. Wright, Substantive Corrective Justice, supra note 12, at 702.
18. Heyman, supra note 12, at 858, 862.
19. By teleological, I mean an interpretation that emphasizes Aristotle's tendency to
explain things primarily with respect to a telos or final end (i.e., with respect to a state of affairs
or characteristic of reality to be pursued). Cf. FRANKLIN I. GAMwELL, THE DIVINE GOOD:
MODERN MORAL THEORY AND THE NECESSITY OF GOD 61 (1990) ("[A] teleological ethic is
one in which the distinction between moral and immoral action as such is identified by
reference to one or more states of affairs or characteristics of existence to be affirmed or
pursued."). For example, in the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle posits a normative ethic
grounded on a teleological principle -a principle that grounds moral claims in a telos (end or
goal). By contrast, Kant proposes a radically nonteleological or deontological principle-the
categorical imperative. Rather than identifying a state of affairs that should be pursued (a
telos), Kant claims that morality must be cleansed of everything empirical by pure practical
reason. See IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS 56 (H.J.
Paton trans., Harper & Row 1964) (1785). Kant proposes the science of morality to purify
ordinary practical reason (the will) of these empirical influences (ends) so that duty may
become the ground of action. In addition, Kant argues that the "supreme moral principle" is
categorical or rationally necessary. Moreover, "if freedom of the will is presupposed, morality,
together with its principle, follows by mere analysis of the concept of freedom." Id. at 115.
2000]
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specifying its relationship to the intellectual virtue of practical
wisdom and the telos of the good life. Under this reading, Aristotle's
conception of corrective justice specifies a method of judicial
decision making whereby only the practically wise (i.e., morally
virtuous) judge can know the content of corrective justice in all
cases. Judging requires moral virtue, not technical, philosophical, or
legal expertise. Aristotle points to Pericles as an example of a man
who exhibits practical wisdom-he knows the good for himself and
for humans in general.' In other words, he knows about the good
life, its relationship to the position of equality, and what corrective
justice requires in particular situations. Pericles will thus be used to
identify the ideal Aristotelian judge who has the practical wisdom
required to determine corrective justice in all cases." Consequently,
this Article advocates a revival of Aristotle's notion that judicial
virtue requires moral virtue and proposes Pericles as the ideal judge.
Because of the striking absence of the teleological conception of
corrective justice in the legal literature, a substantial portion of the
following discussion will be spent elaborating the relationship of
Aristotle's conception of corrective justice to his understanding of
practical wisdom and the telos of the good life. Those familiar with
these arguments may not feel the need to revisit this discusiion, but
for those exposed to corrective justice though its predominantly non-
teleological interpretation, this background will be essential to
understanding the later arguments. The first part will set forth the
forms of justice, including corrective justice. The second part will
discuss the relationship between the moral virtue of corrective
justice, the intellectual virtue of practical wisdom, and the telos of
the good life. The third part will specify how all laws are subjected to
the standard of practical wisdom in the process of their application.
The fourth part will address the issue of the emptiness of corrective
justice and the attempts of legal theorists to deal with this alleged
emptiness. Finally, the last part will attempt to demonstrate how
Pericles, the ideal Aristotelian judge, would exercise practical
wisdom in deciding hard cases.
20. See ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 1140b:8-10 (William D. Ross trans. & rev. by
J.O. Urmson) in 2 THE COMPLETE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 1729 (Jonathan Barnes ed., rev.
Oxford trans., Princeton Univ. Press 1984) [hereinafter N.E.]. Thucydides notes that Pericles
was chosen to give the funeral oration for the first to die in the Peloponnesian War because of
"his intellectual gifts" and "his general reputation." THUCYDIDES, HISTORY OF THE
PELOPONNESIAN WAR 143 (Rex Warner trans., Penguin Books 1972).
21. Ronald Dworkin is well-known for his model of the ideal judge, Hercules, who always
knows the right answer to any legal dispute whether it is an easy case or a hard one. See, e.g.,
RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 354 (1986). My idea for Pericles as the ideal Aristotelian
judge originated in part from Dworkin's ideal judge, Hercules, but also from Aristotle's
description of Pericles as the archetype of the practically wise person. See N.E., supra note 20,
at 1140b:8.
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I. THE FORMS OF JUSTICE AND CORRECTIVE JUSTICE
Aristotle classifies many types or forms of justice in Book V of the
Nicomachean Ethics. The first kind of justice is justice in its broadest
sense, meaning complete virtue "not without qualification, but in
relation to our neighbors."' Aristotle distinguishes justice from the
other virtues because its possessor "can exercise his virtue not only
in himself but towards his neighbor also; for many men can exercise
virtue in their own affairs, but not in their relations with their
neighbors."' In other words, the just person can judge both what is
good for himself and what is good for others. This ability to
determine what is good for another is what distinguishes justice from
the other moral virtues. For this reason, justice is often considered
the "greatest of virtues."24 Aristotle then distinguishes justice as
virtue entire from particular justice "which is a part of virtue."25
Although particular justice and justice as virtue entire "both consist
in a relation to one's neighbor,"26 particular justice classifies the
particular forms of those relations with others as distributive and
corrective (rectificatory) justice. Both of these forms of justice are
concerned with the just as the fair and equal.
A. Distributive Justice
Distributive justice is concerned with apportioning shares of
money and honor between people according to merit in some sense.
The shares will be unequal in amount but they will be equal in
relation to the geometrical proportion of merit (i.e., equality of
ratios). In other words, the thing each person gets will be
proportional to that person's merit, and the ratio of persons to things
will be equal because those relationships are determined by the same
proportion or standard of merit. Thus, the just in this sense is the
proportionate.27
B. Corrective Justice
On the other hand, corrective or rectificatory justice is concerned
with justice in transactions and is a different sort of equality. It
involves both voluntary and involuntary transactions and is
determined by an arithmetical, rather than a geometrical,
proportion. "[T]he just is intermediate between a sort of gain and a
22. N.E., supra note 20, at 1129b:25.
23. Id. at 1129b:32-35.
24. Id. at 1129b:25.
25. Id. at 1130a:14.
26. Id. at 1130a:35.
27. See id. at 1131b:16.
20001
7
Modak-Truran: Corrective Justice and the Revival of Judicial Virtue
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2000
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities [Vol. 12:249
sort of loss.., it consists in having an equal amount before and after
the transaction."' Voluntary exchanges such as a sale or purchase
are just (assuming there is no fraud) because people exchange what
they consider to be equal in value. Conversely, involuntary
transactions (clandestine or violent) require an equalization between
the gain and the loss resulting from the transaction. This equalization
is referred to as corrective justice.
Corrective justice is the intermediate between an involuntary
gain and loss. According to the corrective justice understanding
of legal adjudication, "the law looks only to the distinctive
character of the injury, and treats the parties as equal, if one is
in the wrong and the other is being wronged, and if one inflicted
injury and the other has received it. Therefore, this kind of
injustice being an inequality, the judge tries to equalize it."
Aristotle further emphasizes that "[j]ustice is a kind of mean, but
not in the same way as the other virtues, but because it relates to an
intermediate amount, while injustice relates to the extremes."' For
example, between rashness and cowardice, courage is the mean, and
between self-indulgence and insensibility, temperance is the mean.
In those cases, the mean is between an excess and a defect with
respect to one person's virtuous disposition. By contrast, corrective
justice is a mean between "acting unjustly and being unjustly
treated," both of which are extremes that corrective justice rectifies.31
In that case, the mean is between two extremes because justice is a
virtuous disposition that has to do with our relation to our neighbors.
Consequently, if I act unjustly toward you, my excess or injustice
produces an excess of what is useful for me and an excess of what is
harmful to you. Moreover, Aristotle analogizes corrective justice to
an arithmetical proportion. This is why the equal is also
called the just (dikaion), because it is a division into two equal
parts (dikha), just as if one were to call it dikaion; and the judge
(dikastes) is one who bisects (dikhastes). For when something is
subtracted from one of two equals and added to the other, the
other is in excess by these two; since if what was taken from the
one had not been added to the other, the latter would have been
in excess by one only.32
Aristotle notes, however, that the terms "gain" and "loss" may not
be appropriate for describing all involuntary transactions, but he
28. Id. at 1132b:18-20.
29. Id. at 1132a:4-7.
30. Id. at 1133b:33-35.
31. Id. at 1133b:32.
32. Id. at 1132a:30-34.
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intends the terms "gain" and "loss" to apply figuratively to the
person who inflicts a wound and to the person who suffers the
wound.
For the purpose of the following discussion, it is important to
recognize that determining whether there is a gain or loss requires
the judge to determine three things: 1) the position of equality, 2) the
gain, and 3) the loss. The key element is the position of equality.
Corrective justice, like all the virtues, is proposing a mean (the
position of equality) as the norm for determining just action and just
treatment. The gain and loss are merely relative to the determination
of the position of equality. In easy cases, the position of equality is
merely the status quo before the interaction of the parties (i.e., pre-
interaction holdings or the apparent legal rights of the parties before
the involuntary transaction occurred). For example, if A hits B, the
law of most communities would recognize B's right to recover in
most cases. Excluding exceptions such as where A is acting in self-
defense, B would have the right to be free from bodily invasion,
which is what we would consider part of the parties' pre-interaction
holdings (position of equality). Consequently, an injury or loss has
occurred because the action in question violated the mean of
equality.33
Despite this formal analysis of corrective justice, we can still ask:
What gains and losses does corrective justice rectify? Does corrective
justice only rectify unjust acts or does it rectify the unjust injuries
suffered by actions which are not unjust? In order to identify more
particularly when a gain or loss has occurred, Aristotle specifies
three kinds of injury that corrective justice rectifies.' To understand
these three types of injury, it is important to realize that Aristotle
focuses on "the distinctive character of the injury" rather than on the
"character of the person." He argues that "it makes no difference
whether a good man has defrauded a bad man or a bad man a good
one ... the law looks only to the distinctive character of the injury.""
33. Cf. Wright, Substantive Corrective Justice, supra note 12, at 699 ("[T]he criteria of
equality for distributive and corrective justice, respectively" are "the criteria for identifying
unjust gains and losses."). To the contrary, many legal theorists have focused on the notions of
"wrong" and "loss" as central to understanding corrective justice. See, e.g., Coleman, The
Mixed Conception, supra note 11, at 441. Coleman appears to be right to emphasize that in
certain circumstances there are injuries that are not compensated for directly by the person
causing the injury. For example, in states adopting a no-fault insurance scheme, the parties
make claims against their own insurance company for their injuries. However, it is not that
there is a separation of the wrongfulness of the action from the injury in these cases but that
the action itself is not considered wrongful by the society. The position of equality or the norm
governing our relationship in the context of an automobile accident holds that no wrong or
injury has occurred in relation to the other party.
34. See N.E., supra note 20, at 1135a:15-1136a:10.
35. Id. at 1132a:2-4.
20001
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He recognizes a separation between the justice of persons and the
justice of actions. In the following three types of injury, note that
certain actions indicate that the actor is unjust while other actions
are unjust or only incidentally unjust without the actor being unjust.
First, injuries resulting from intentionally unjust actions are injuries
caused by "unjust persons." These intentionally unjust actions are
actions that are done voluntarily (i.e., with knowledge and not
coincidentally or under compulsion)36 and by choice (i.e., after
deliberation or intentionally). In such cases, the action and the actor
are unjust. Second, injuries resulting from unintentionally unjust
actions or "acts of injustice" are those done voluntarily but not by
choice. Here, the actions are unjust but the person is not because the
person unintentionally caused the injury. Aristotle gives the example
of actions "due to anger or to other passions necessary or natural to
man."37 Finally, injuries resulting from mistakes are unjust injuries
that are caused by actions done in ignorance. Aristotle claims that
these actions are involuntary because they are performed without
knowledge such that "the person acted on, the act, the instrument, or
the end that will be attained is other than the agent supposed. 38
Mistakes are unjust, but only incidentally, because they are the
unintended consequence of the actions causing them. Aristotle
further divides this general notion of mistakes into: 1) a particular
notion of mistake-actions resulting in injuries by misjudgments of
reasonable expectation (i.e., objectively foreseeable results that were
not subjectively foreseen); and 2) misadventures -actions resulting
in injuries that are contrary to reasonable expectation (i.e., not
objectively foreseeable).39
This classification of injuries and the distinction between the
justice of actions and the justice of persons, however, should not be
interpreted to mean that corrective justice only rectifies the actions
of unjust people. Rather, given that corrective justice is the mean
between both "acting unjustly and being unjustly treated," it should
be clear that corrective justice rectifies all three types of unjust
injuries, not only unjust injuries stemming from the action of an
unjust person.' In fact, note that Aristotle's specification of these
36. See id. at 1109b:35-1111a:24.
37. Id. at 1135b:20-21.
38. Id. at 1135b:12-13. Note that Aristotle only refers to "three kinds of injury in
transactions between man and man." Id. However, he divides mistakes into two categories-
mistake in a particular sense and misadventures-which thus result in four kinds of injury
rather than three.
39. See id. at 1135b:12-19.
40. There is considerable disagreement about whether Aristotle limits corrective justice to
rectifying deliberately caused injuries (first and second types) or whether he intends corrective
justice to rectify all three types of unjust injuries. Compare Wright, Substantive Corrective
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three types of injuries roughly correlates with the three traditional
categories of tort claims: intentional torts-wrongs by unjust
persons; negligence-acts of injustice and mistakes; and strict
liability-misadventures. Corrective justice thus requires that judges
remedy injuries (gains and losses) resulting both from unjust actions
and from unjust treatment.
II. THE VIRTUES AND THE TELOS OF THE GOOD LIFE
As discussed more fully in Part III, many interpreters of corrective
justice take this formal description as the end of their inquiry about
corrective justice. From this brief discussion in Book V, Chapter 4 of
the Nicomachean Ethics, they conclude that corrective justice does
not have any specific content.4 They argue that corrective justice
fails to provide any substantive definition of the position of equality
that determines the legal relationship of parties involved in
involuntary transactions. Aristotle is thus assumed to presuppose the
existence of legal rights rather than to specify the content of those
legal rights.
The content of corrective justice is not evident from this formal
statement, however, because the formal statement fails to relate
corrective justice to Aristotle's wider project of discussing the moral
virtues and their relationship to the intellectual virtues in the good
life.42 Although Aristotle's notion of corrective justice and its mean
of equality are formal, they receive content, as with all moral virtues,
through agents (judges) exercising the intellectual virtue of
phronesis, or practical wisdom. In other words, corrective justice and
the position of equality are saved from emptiness by phronesis, or
practical wisdom, as are the rest of the virtues." Thus, by
understanding corrective justice in this fuller context, it becomes
evident that the content of corrective justice comes from exercising
the intellectual virtue of practical wisdom and from the teleology of
the good life. This part will develop this context in preparation for
Justice, supra note 12, at 697-98 ("Although it is not entirely clear, Aristotle apparently treats
each of these injuries in interaction-whether due to acts of injustice, mistakes, or
misadventure-as unjust losses, requiring rectification.") with Gordley, supra note 12, at 140
("Aristotle had only intentionally inflicted harm in mind.") and Posner, supra note 15, at 201
("[Aristotle] did not consider negligence the kind of wrongful conduct that triggers a duty of
rectification.").
41. See supra note 15.
42. Cf. ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, WHOSE JUSTICE? WHICH RATIONALITY? 103 (1988)
("Expositions of Aristotle on justice characteristically make little or no reference to his
account of practical reasoning; and discussions of Aristotle on practical reasoning, or on the
theory of action more generally, are apt to say nothing about justice.").
43. See RICHARD KRAUT, ARISTOTLE ON THE HUMAN GOOD 327 (1989) ("And to
understand the proper place of this virtue of thought [phronesis], we must see how Book VI of
the NE saves Aristotle's earlier statements about the mean from emptiness.").
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the more complete description of the content of corrective justice in
the third part.
A. Moral Virtue and Practical Wisdom
For Aristotle, corrective justice is a moral virtue and has the same
general characteristics as the rest of the moral virtues. Moral virtue
"is a state of character concerned with choice, lying in a mean, i.e.
the mean relative to us, this being determined by a rational principle,
and by that principle by which the man of practical wisdom would
determine it."' A state of character is a disposition or a rational
ordering of the soul's capacity to desire. One becomes virtuous by
having the right ordering of the desires or the right disposition and
by choosing to do virtuous acts. In other words, we become just by
doing just acts, brave by doing brave acts, and so forth. Right desire
is the virtuous disposition and the intermediate between excess and
deficiency. For example, between rashness and cowardice, courage is
the mean, and between self-indulgence and insensibility, temperance
is the mean. In this respect, corrective justice is slightly different
because equality is a mean between "acting unjustly and being
unjustly treated," both of which are extremes. 5 Furthermore, that a
mean is relative to us means that we should take into consideration
"the right person, to the right extent, at the right time, with the right
motive, and in the right way."' In addition, the requirement that
virtue involve choice means that the virtuous act requires thought or
deliberation and must be voluntary (i.e., with knowledge and not
coincidentally or under compulsion). The deliberation involved in
choice involves determining the mean (or rational principle) that the
practically wise person, possessing the intellectual virtue of practical
wisdom or phronesis, would use to make the choice. The person of
practical wisdom takes pleasure in what he ought to and acts
according to the right rule. Thus, moral virtue is a state of character
concerned with choice, which is not fully realized without the
intellectual virtue of practical wisdom.
Likewise, the intellectual virtue of practical wisdom never exists
apart from moral virtue; it is the practical thought of a good person.
Moral virtue compels us to aim at the right end while practical
wisdom compels us to choose the right means. "Intellect itself," says
Aristotle, "moves nothing, but only the intellect which aims at an
end and is practical."47 In the strict sense, neither is it possible to be
44. N.E., supra note 20, at 1106b:36-1107a:2.
45. Id. at 1133b:32.
46. Id. at 1109a:27-28.
47. Id. at 1139a:36-37.
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good without practical wisdom nor is it possible to be practically wise
without moral virtue. Those who are not correctly habituated to act
virtuously -Aristotle calls them young in character or lacking
experience -cannot become practically wise."8 Hence Aristotle
asserts that "any one who is to listen intelligently to lectures about
what is noble and just and, generally, about the subjects of political
science must have been brought up in good habits."' 9 In other words,
one has to have the beginnings of the moral virtues (habituation in
the moral virtues) before one can acquire practical wisdom. Practical
wisdom must begin with the facts relevant to it-good actions. One
who is young in character, however, is inexperienced in good actions.
As a result, practical reason does not make bad people (those not
habituated in moral virtues) good but makes good people (those
already habituated in moral virtues) better. Moreover, it is not an
attempt to discover the good for humans but to clarify what was
already vaguely known to be good by its students-to clarify the
bull's-eye on the target at which these people already habitually aim.
In addition, to fully understand the nature of practical wisdom
requires an understanding of the parts of the soul, because human
virtue is a matter of the soul rather than the body. ° The soul has an
irrational principle and a rational one. The irrational element has a
vegetative division that is primarily concerned with nutrition and
growth. The activity of this division of the soul seems to be common
to humans and animals and, like the state of sleep, does not have a
lot to do with goodness and badness. The other irrational element of
the soul, however, shares in the rational element and plays a part in
the state of moral virtue. This is the desiring element, which can
resist and/or obey the rational element. In the continent person, for
example, the irrational desires obey the rational element, while in
the incontinent person they do not. The rational element also has
two divisions: one that tries to control the desiring element of the
irrational side (calculative) and the rational element in the strict
sense, which is independent of desiring (contemplative). Moral
virtue concerns the excellent functioning of the rational element of
the soul to the extent that desire obeys it and involves the
intellectual virtue of practical wisdom. Moral virtue begins with
habit; one becomes morally virtuous by doing virtuous acts. By
contrast, the intellectual virtues of philosophical wisdom and
theoretical understanding concern the excellent function of the
rational element to the extent that it is independent of desire. These
48. See id. at 1095a:2-3
49. Id. at 1095b:5-7.
50. See generally id. at 1102a:15-1103a:4.
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intellectual virtues begin and grow by teaching: They are
contemplative activities pursuing knowledge. Thus, the virtues are
divided into moral virtues (justice, temperance, liberality,
continence, etc.) and intellectual virtues (philosophical wisdom,
understanding, and practical wisdom), which correspond to the
excellent functioning of the two rational parts of the soul."
Practical wisdom is the intellectual virtue which implies the
excellent functioning of that part of the soul which grasps the
rational principle by which we contemplate variable things and by
which we discipline the desires. This part of the soul calculates about
good action. Calculating about good action requires deliberation not
only about universals but also about particulars. Aristotle gives an
example about dry food being good for every person, which may be
more generally summarized as:
(1) X is good for humans (universal).
(2) This is X (particular).
(3) This is good for me (conclusion), or I do X (action)."
Moreover, practical wisdom "is a true and reasoned state of
capacity to act with regard to things that are good or bad for
[humans] ... good action itself is its end."53 The mark of a person of
practical wisdom is that he deliberates well not about what is good
and expedient for himself in a particular respect, e.g., for the sake of
health or strength, but about what is good and expedient for the
good life in general, including health or strength to the extent they
are relevant to the good life. 4 For example, it is good and expedient
to exercise because it promotes good health, but it is not practically
wise to become an exercise fanatic and thereby eliminate other
aspects of a good life like education. Consequently, the good action
required by moral virtue depends on the intellectual virtue of
practical wisdom.
In the case of the moral virtue of corrective justice, practical
wisdom is thus required for good action. Good action requires
determining the position of equality, which is the mean between
unjust gain and loss. As will be shown below, in easy cases, the
position of equality will be obvious even to those judges without
practical wisdom. Either the common law or the statutory law
already includes the practically wise determination of the position of
equality. In hard cases, however, the position of equality will only be
known by a virtuous judge-a judge with the intellectual virtue of
51. See id. at 1103a:4-10.
52. See id. at 1147a:5-7.
53. Id. at 1140b:5-7.
54. See id. at 1140a:25-28.
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practical wisdom. Aristotle's judge must thus be morally virtuous
and intellectually virtuous in order to determine the position of
equality in all cases. She must have both the proper state of character
so that she desires the good of another and practical wisdom so that
she has the capacity to decide what is good and expedient for
another. As indicated above, Aristotle points to Pericles as an
example of a man who exhibits the mark of a person of practical
wisdom; he knows the good for himself and for humans in general.5
In other words, Pericles knows about the good life in general and its
relationship to the position of equality and is capable of determining
corrective justice in all cases.
B. The Nature of a Thing and the Telos of the Good Life
In addition, understanding the nature of the position of equality
and its relationship to the good life requires an understanding of
Aristotle's methodological principles. One of Aristotle's basic
methodological principles is to explain the nature of a thing"
primarily by its end or telos. For example, Aristotle begins the
Nicomachean Ethics by stating that "[e]very art and every inquiry,
and similarly every action and pursuit, is thought to aim at some
good; and for this reason the good has rightly been declared to be
that at which all things aim.""7 In his fuller account, he explains or
gives reasons for things in terms of four causes: 1) the material cause
(what is it made of?); 2) the formal cause (what is it?); 3) the
efficient cause (by what agent?); and 4) the final cause (for what
end?).5" However, for Aristotle, the final cause is the most
comprehensive. 9 "For what each thing is when fully developed, we
55. See id. at 1140b:8-10.
56. Although the nature of something may be a form, it is not formal (in the sense of being
empty) but describes the shape something will become. "[Flor a thing is more properly said to
be what it is when it has attained to fulfillment than when it exists potentially.... What grows
qua growing grows from something into something. Into what then does it grow? Not into that
from which it arose [i.e., matter] but into that to which it tends. The shape then is nature."
ARISTOTLE, PHYSICS 193b:8-10, 17-18 (R.P. Hardie & R.K. Gaye trans.), in 1 THE COMPLETE
WORKS OF ARISTOTLE, supra note 20, at 315 [hereinafter PHYSICS].
57. N.E., supra note 20, at 1094a:1-3.
58. See PHYSICS, supra note 56, at 194b:16-195a:26.
59. Although the final cause is the most comprehensive, both efficient and final causes are
of special interest to Aristotle because they explain movement and activity. In modem times,
causation has been reduced to efficient causation. Understanding something is a matter of
understanding the prior agents producing that thing in accord with law-like regularities. In this
respect, Kant tried to explain morality as an act of self-legislation so that morality, the realm of
human freedom, would be explained by law-like regularities analogous to those of science,
which explain the phenomenal realm of efficient causation. See KANT, supra note 19, at 57-58.
Contrary to this modem trend, Whitehead speaks of both efficient and final causation. In
effect, he argues that Aristotle's material causation can be reduced to efficient causation and
that formal causation can be reduced to final causation. See A.N. WHITEHEAD, PROCESS AND
REALITY 84 (corrected ed. 1978) ("[Aristotle's] philosophy led to a wild overstressing of the
notion of 'final causes' during the Christian middle ages; and thence, by a reaction, to the
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call its nature, whether we are speaking of a man, a horse, or a
family."' Nature is a principle of inner change and explains things in
terms of what they are for or for the sake of. In other words, each
thing, including its motion and activity, is best understood by what it
is when it is fully developed, or by its end.
The ends towards which things aim (including the end of corrective
justice), however, are different. Each irreducibly different subject
matter has an irreducibly different end (for instance, medical art-
health; shipbuilding-a vessel; strategy -victory; economics-
wealth) and has a science appropriate to it.6 Each science thus
begins with the experience of its distinct irreducible subject matter
(i.e., inductively). "[T]he fact is the starting point."62 As a result, an
examination of the nature of corrective justice in Aristotle's thought
must take into consideration the end of corrective justice (restoring
the position of equality), the facts particular to corrective justice (just
actions of good people), and the science appropriate to it (practical
science).
As noted above, the person of practical wisdom, Pericles, is one
who has been habituated in the moral virtues and knows the facts
relevant to moral virtue including corrective justice. In addition,
Pericles uses practical science as his method of determining
corrective justice because practical (or political) science is the
science appropriate to examining the good for humans, or happiness.
Aristotle argues that because "politics uses the rest of the sciences,
and... legislates as to what we are to do and what we are to abstain
from, the end of this science must include those of the others, so that
this end must be the good for man."'63
In the most inclusive sense, practical science studies all activities
and ends that are pursued by humans.' In a more specific sense, it is
contrasted with the theoretical sciences. Practical science is
concerned with the activities of human action and the end of good
action in the political life. Theoretical science is concerned with the
activity of contemplation and the end of knowledge in the
philosophical life.65 Furthermore, as with any moral virtue, Aristotle
correlative overstressing of the notion of 'efficient causes' during the modem scientific period.
One task of sound metaphysics is to exhibit final and efficient causes in their proper relation to
each other.").
60. ARISTOTLE, THE POLIcS 1252b:32 (B. Jowett trans.), in 2 THE COMPLETE WORKS
OF ARISTOTLE, supra note 20, at 1986. [hereinafter POL.].
61. See N.E., supra note 20, at 1094a:7-9.
62. Id. at 1095b:6. Aristotle, then, can be classified as a specific teleologist and a specific
empiricist.
63. Id. at 1094b:5-7.
64. See KRAUT, supra note 43, at 221. Kraut argues that political science, however,
probably does not govern the theoretical sciences. See id. at 222 n.19.
65. Further, in the most restricted sense, practical science is concerned with the actions of
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maintains that to understand the specific end of corrective justice
(restoring the position of equality) requires understanding the more
general end for humans (the good life) of which it is a part.
Consequently, if the end of practical science is "the good for
[humans]" or happiness, the end of corrective justice-which is
restoring the correct relationship between the parties to a legal
dispute (i.e., the position of equality)-must be determined in
relation to that end.
Aristotle claims that for humans, "there is some end to the things
we do, which we desire for its own sake" and "this must be the good
and the chief good," which he refers to as eudaimonia, or happiness.'
The highest good or happiness determines the purpose of human
relationships, including the position of equality. This requires
knowing "the function of [humans]." "[W]hat is peculiar to
[humans]," Aristotle claims, is "a certain kind of life... an activity or
actions of the soul implying a rational principle, and the function of
the good man [is] the good and noble performance of these .... "67
Aristotle points out that there is general verbal agreement that the
chief good for humans is happiness and that it is identified with living
well and doing well. Substantively, however, there is disagreement
about what happiness is (pleasure, honor, etc.). Whatever happiness
is, it is something final, desired in and of itself and "never for the
sake of something else."' In addition, it is self-sufficient or deficient
in no good thing. Thus, happiness is the end of human action, and it
is a first principle.
Aristotle answers the question of what happiness or the good for
humans is in two ways, and each way terminates in a single end or
first principle.69 First, "happiness is an activity of soul in accordance
with perfect virtue."'7 In this sense, happiness consists in the
theoretical activity of contemplation, which is pursued in the life of
the philosopher. Through contemplation, humans can attain perfect
virtue or the highest virtue, which is "the best thing in us."'" Aristotle
argues that reason-by which he means theoretical reason or the
rational part of the soul that is independent of desire and by which
we contemplate invariable things-is "the best thing in us" or
"doing" and pursuing the end of "doing well," while productive science is concerned with the
actions of "making" and pursuing the end of making things well.
66. N.E., supra note 20, at 1094a:18-20.
67. Id. at 1098a:1-15. See also POL., supra note 60, at 1253a:16-18 ("And it is a
characteristic of man that he alone has any sense of good and evil, of just and unjust, and the
like, and the association of living beings who have this sense makes a family and a state.").
68. N.E., supra note 20, at 1097a:33.
69. See generally KRAUT, supra note 43, at 3-9.
70. N.E., supra note 20, at 1102a:5.
71. Id. at 1177a:13.
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"something divine present in [us]. ' 2 Moreover, the human capacity
to contemplate or reason theoretically is what is most akin in us to
the activity of God, which is contemplation. "And this activity
alone," Aristotle contends, "would seem to be loved for its own sake;
for nothing arises from it apart from the contemplating, while from
practical activities we gain more or less apart from the action.""
Thus, perfect happiness is a contemplative activity and the
philosophical life that pursues contemplation is the best kind of life.
Although the philosophical life is the best and most perfect life,
Aristotle argues that "in a secondary degree the life in accordance
with the other kind of virtue [moral virtue] is happy; for the activities
in accordance with this befit our human estate."7 Here, Aristotle
refers to a morally virtuous life or the political life as an alternative
way of pursuing the good for humans. The good life in its political
form is constituted by doing good acts, which requires desiring the
good and the practical wisdom to calculate what action will achieve
that good. Both the philosophical life and the political life are lives
involving excellent functioning of the rational capacities of the soul.
The philosophical life involves the excellent functioning of the
rational part of the soul that is separate from desire. The political life
involves the excellent functioning of the rational part of the soul that
disciplines the desires. In addition, the philosophical and political
lives both involve the moral virtues. "[T]he philosophical life is life
of the good person, that is, someone who has and exercises the
ethical virtues" and who also engages in contemplation." In this
respect, the philosophical and political lives both require the goods
of the moral virtues such as justice and courage. Further, they both
require the intellectual virtue of practical wisdom. These virtues are
the most important ends that these two types of lives share and are
qualities that every good person must have whether leading a
philosophical or political life. Consequently, Aristotle gives them a
lot of attention in the Nicomachean Ethics even though his major
concern is the political life and the intrinsic good for which that life is
led.
Furthermore, the highest good for humans is achieved in a state
because the state is prior to individuals and humans are by nature
political animals:
The proof that the state is a creation of nature and prior to
the individual is that the individual, when isolated, is not self-
72. Id. at 1177b:26.
73. Id. at 1177b:1-5.
74. Id. at 1178a:9-10.
75. KRAUT, supra note 43, at 6.
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sufficing; and therefore he is like a part in relation to the whole.
But he who is unable to live in society, or who has not need
because he is sufficient for himself, must be either a beast or a
god.7
6
Humans are uniquely suited for living in states, and the state that
"exists for the sake of the good life"' 7 is uniquely suited to enable
individuals to achieve their highest end-happiness (eudaimonia).
Contrary to what most liberal notions of the state propose, the state
is natural and functions to help citizens to perfect their virtue rather
than functioning as a mechanism to resolve conflicting individual
pursuits of the good." "Political society," Aristotle maintains, "exists
for the sake of noble actions, and not of living together. ' 79 The good
of the individual is not a private affair but the public life of a citizen
is necessary for the individual's attainment of the highest good.' As
a result, there is a correlation between the good of an individual and
the good of the community; citizenship is conceived "as a form of
action geared toward the good of the whole."8 "Neither must we
suppose that anyone of the citizens belongs to himself, for they all
belong to the state, and each of them a part of the state, and the care
of each part is inseparable from the care of the whole."' The telos of
restoring the position of equality is thus defined in relation to the
state or political community that aims at the highest good and
"embraces all the rest. 8 3
76. POL., supra note 60, at 1253a:25-29.
77. Id. at 1280a:33
78. For a discussion of the Aristotelian roots of the revival of republicanism and the notion
of civic virtue, see Lawrence B. Solum, Virtues and Voices, 66 CHm.-KENT L. REV. 111, 114-22
(1990). See also Miriam Galston, Taking Aristotle Seriously: Republican-Oriented Legal Theory
and the Moral Foundation of Deliberative Democracy, 82 CAL. L. REV. 329 (1994).
79. POL., supra note 60, at 1281a:2-3.
80. Although discussed below, at this point, I am begging the problem of the class- and
gender-bound nature of Aristotle's definition of citizen to include only gentlemen (at the
exclusion of women, laborers, slaves, etc.), and speaking in general about the relationship
between the good of the community and the good of the individual (as if it included the good
of all individuals equally).
81. JEAN BETHKE ELSHTAIN, PUBLIC MAN, PRIVATE WOMAN: WOMEN IN SOCIAL AND
POLITICAL THOUGHT 51 (2d ed. 1993). Further, Elshtain notes that Aristotle also excluded
certain categories of persons (e.g., women, slaves, mechanics, and laborers) from politics
because he did not think they had the rational capacity required for ruling or citizenship. For
example, "Aristotle's women were idiots in the Greek sense of the word, persons who either
could not or did not participate in the polis or the 'good' of public life, individuals without a
public voice, condemned to silence as their appointed sphere and condition." Id. at 47.
Although most of us would reject Aristotle's particular evaluations of the nature of these
categories of persons, we can adopt Aristotle's notion of politics as a form of action and his
claims about the relationship between the individual good and the good of the state. See id. at
53.
82. POL., supra note 60, at 1337a:27-31.
83. Id. at 1252a:5.
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C. The End of Corrective Justice and the Telos of the Good Life
However, the nature of the relationship between specific ends or
goods, such as restoring the position of equality, and the highest
good, or happiness, has been the subject of much controversy. Some
have claimed that Aristotle's highest good is merely a combination
of all the other goods-the inclusive doctrine of eudaimonia'-and
others have argued that there is only one supreme end, which is
dominant but not inclusive-the dominant doctrine of eudaimonia.85
By contrast, Richard Kraut argues that highest good "is not identical
with or composed out of the other objects [goods] contained within
it."' Rather, the highest good or the "political end is related to the
other ends as a surrounding object is related to the objects it
surrounds."' As a result, the highest end embraces or contains the
rest of the goods and determines "the proper degree to which any
other end is to be pursued."'
Rather than enter into this debate here, I will adopt and briefly set
forth Professor Kraut's interpretation, which he elaborates in his
book Aristotle on the Human Good.89 Under this interpretation,
practical science calculates how the highest good (the final end or the
good life) relates to the position of equality (the end of corrective
justice) under the circumstances of the particular case.' In addition,
recall that Aristotle argues that corrective justice is a moral virtue
and thus a matter of the political life. It is one of the virtues
necessary for the good life in the political sense. Corrective justice
involves the human action of calculating the mean (the position of
equality) between the gain and the loss. Like the other moral virtues,
the end of corrective justice or the position of equality is an end in
itself, but it is not a perfect end. The position of equality is for the
sake of the perfect end of the political life or a component of it.9 The
84. See, e.g., J.L. ACKRILL, Aristotle on Eudaimonia, in ESSAYS ON ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS
15-33 (A. Rorty ed., 1980).
85. See, e.g., W.F.R. HARDIE, The Final Good in Aristotle's Ethics, in ARISTOTLE: A
COLLECTION OF CRITICAL ESSAYS 297-322 (J.M.E.Moravcsik ed. 1967) (noting a certain
confusion about ends in Aristotle's thought, but arguing that Aristotle "makes the supreme
end not inclusive but dominant, the object of one prime desire, philosophy.").
86. KRAUT, supra note 43, at 224.
87. Id. at 223.
88. Id. at 224. In other words, Kraut seems to be suggesting here that the highest good is
both dominant and inclusive.
89. Id.
90. See id. at 221-22.
91. Of course, "the best and most perfect" life is the philosophical life of contemplation,
but the political life is the perfect life of action. See id. at 237-44. The political leader, however,
promotes the ultimate end of moral activity rather than contemplation "not because moral
activity is better, but because it is the highest good that all citizens can achieve." Id. at 210.
Further,
[t]he ideal way to promote the good of others is to help them arrange their lives in such a
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political life is desirable for its own sake, for the sake of nothing else,
and all other ends of the political life are desirable for its sake. The
political life or the cultivation and full exercise of the moral virtues
thus provides a standard for evaluating lesser goods such as
friendship, physical pleasure, honor, and financial resources. For
example, a certain level of external goods (such as food, clothing,
shelter, etc.) is morally significant because they are required to lead a
good life; they support both theoretical and practical virtuous
activity.' Consequently, Kraut maintains that "since Aristotle argues
that the ultimate end of every political community and every
individual should be some form of virtuous activity, he must say that
health, music, and all other goods should be valued and pursued to
the extent that they make some contribution to philosophical or
moral activity."93
Kraut further argues that the political life also provides a standard
for determining the scope of the moral virtues. In conjunction with
practical wisdom, legislators and judges use this standard to promote
the good of others by helping to arrange their lives to become as
morally virtuous as possible.' In determining the position of
equality, they will determine what goods (including moral virtues)
are at stake and evaluate their appropriate scope according to the
hierarchy of ends. Consequently, Pericles balances the demands of
corrective justice in the case at hand with the future implications of
that decision (ex ante) for the overall impact on promoting moral
virtue for the whole community. In other words, Kraut contends that
practical science is concerned with balancing all relevant goods for
the well-being of the whole community, and sometimes the well-
being of the whole community must be put ahead of individual well-
being.95 As a result, practical wisdom allows judges and legislators to
determine the position of equality in terms of the end of the political
life for a particular community (ultimate end), which takes into
way that they contemplate as much as possible. But Aristotle assumes that the number of
people who are suited to such a life is small, and so in most cases one best promotes the
good of others by using virtuous practical activity as a standard.
Id. at 157.
92. See N.E., supra note 20, at 1099a:31-b:8, 1101a:14-16.
93. KRAUT, supra note 43, at 160.
94. Corrective justice, however, requires that the judge ignore the virtue of the parties in
the dispute. For this reason, I will not address the implications of Aristotle's multi-tiered
analysis of equality for practical decision making in general. In his discussion of equality, recall
that Aristotle develops a hierarchy of the types of citizens (men are higher than women, who
are higher than slaves) and a hierarchy of virtue (the virtuous are more desiring of honor and
other goods than the non-virtuous). To the contrary, I will presume that the parties to a legal
dispute are equal and analyze the distinctive character of the injury as required by corrective
justice.
95. See KRAUT, supra note 43, at 92-93 (arguing that some individuals may be ostracized
for the good of the community).
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account all the relevant ends of both the other moral virtues
(desirable in themselves and for the sake of the political life) and the
other goods like friends and wealth (instrumental goods-desirable
not in themselves, but only for the sake of other goods).'
III. THE PRIMACY OF PRACrICAL WISDOM
The role of practical wisdom in judicial decision making, however,
is not as pronounced in all cases. In easy cases, the common law
(prior judicial wisdom) and statutory law (legislative wisdom) will
reflect the community's notions of the good life so that even a judge
of lesser stature than Pericles could determine what the position of
equality entails without much trouble. For example, if A hits B, the
law of most communities and the practically wise position of equality
would recognize B's right to recover for battery in most cases. This
may partially explain why many interpreters of Aristotle claim that
corrective justice is empty and merely presupposes the legal rights of
the relevant community. They may be focusing only on the easy
cases. By contrast, in hard cases, where the law is indeterminate,
conflicting, or ambiguous,' the role of practical wisdom becomes
more pronounced. The position of equality is not entirely
determined by the relevant legal principles, and only a practically
wise judge like Pericles will be able to decide what is the just
definition of the position of equality in all cases.
Further, although Aristotle recognizes that the existing laws
should be given a strong presumption of validity," he makes two
arguments in support of the primacy of the practically wise definition
of the position of equality over the apparently relevant legal
principles. First, Aristotle claims that some matters do not lend
themselves to "a general principle embracing all the particulars" and
must be decided by judicial decree.' His most extensive discussion of
this idea is in the Nicomachean Ethics with respect to equity, which
96. For a more complete discussion of the three kinds of ends, see id. at 228-30.
97. The distinction made here and elsewhere in this Article between easy and hard cases is
purposely left quite general and vague. I give indeterminacy, ambiguity, and conflicting
principles as examples of situations where the apparently relevant statutes, common law
principles, or contracts at issue do not clearly resolve disputes. Many theorists now refer to this
broadly as legal indeterminacy. See, e.g., Ken Kress, Legal Indeterminacy and Legitimacy, in
LEGAL HERMENEUTICS: HISTORY, THEORY, AND PRACTICE 200 (Gregory Leyh ed., 1992).
98. See POL., supra note 60, at 1269a:12-22. Here Aristotle argues that changing the laws
should be done with caution because changing the law may decrease the power of the law. The
law attains its force through the habit of citizens' obedience and changing it might weaken this
habit. Also, citizens are habituated into virtue by the law. If the law changes too often, the
habituation loses its impact.
99. Id. at 1282b:5; see also id. at 1269a:10-11 (noting that "it is impossible that all things
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he calls "a corrective of legal justice." There he states:
the equitable is just, but not the legally just but a correction of
legal justice. The reason is that all law is universal but about
some things it is not possible to make a universal statement
which shall be correct. In those cases, then, in which it is
necessary to speak universally, but not possible to do so
correctly, the law takes the usual case, though it is not ignorant
of the possibility of error. And it is none the less correct; for the
error is not in the law nor in the legislator but in the nature of
the thing, since the matter of practical affairs is of this kind from
the start. When the law speaks universally, then, and a case
arises on it which is not covered by the universal statement, then
it is right, where the legislator fails us and has erred by over-
simplicity, to correct the omission-to say what the legislator
himself would have put into his law if he had known. Hence the
equitable is just, and better than one kind of justice - not better
than absolute justice, but better than the error that arises from
the absoluteness of statement. And this is the nature of the
equitable, a correction of law where it is defective owing to its
universality. In fact this is the reason why all things are not
determined by law, viz. that about some things it is impossible to
lay down a law, so that a decree is needed. For when the thing is
indefinite the rule also is indefinite, like the leaden rule used in
making the Lesbian moulding; the rule adapts itself to the shape
of the stone and is not rigid, and so too the decree is adapted to
the facts.1"
Thus, in cases where equity requires, the practically wise judge
must develop a more specific definition of the position of equality
that takes precedence over the more general legal definition."' In
addition, Aristotle suggests at points that a practically unwise law
(i.e., a law contrary to the position of equality as determined by
Pericles), either absolutely or in a particular application, is not a
valid law. Aristotle claims that "[t]he best man, then, must legislate,
and laws must be passed, but these laws will have no authority when
they miss the mark, though in all other cases retaining their
100. N.E., supra note 20, at 1137b:11-32.
101. See also ALBERT R. JONSEN & STEPHEN TOULMIN, THE ABUSE OF CASUISTRY: A
HISTORY OF MORAL REASONING 68 (1988). In a chapter entitled "Roots of Casuistry in
Antiquity," the authors focus heavily on Aristotle's discussion of practical wisdom and note
that
[a] prudent, understanding judge or agent can never treat universal laws or principles as
absolute or invariable. There is always room for discretion in asking how far general
rules, as they stand, apply to particular fresh cases, however marginal and ambiguous,
and how far they should be waived or bent (like a builder's leaden ruler) to respect the
exceptional character of novel situations.
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authority."'" He further comments that some ancient laws "are quite
absurd... and it would be ridiculous to rest contented with their
notions.""0 3 He gives the example of a Cumae law that would allow
someone to be found guilty of murder if the accuser could produce a
number of witnesses from the accused's own kinsmen.'" Further
support for this position comes from Aristotle's differentiation of
political justice into natural and legal justice. Natural justice is "that
which everywhere has the same force and does not exist by people's
thinking this or that," while legal justice is "that which is originally
indifferent, but when it has been laid down is not indifferent.'10 5
Consequently, by distinguishing between natural and positive law"
and by denying that all law is merely a matter of convention or
positive enactment,"° Aristotle is proposing a natural law theory. But
unlike unchanging Stoic natural law,"° Aristotle's theory maintains
that "there is something that is just even by nature, yet all of it is
changeable; but still some is by nature, some not by nature."'" Thus,
at first blush, these claims suggest that the practically wise judge may
invalidate the legal definition of the position of equality, in general
102. POL., supra note 60, at 1286a:22-24.
103. Id. at 1268b:42, 1269a:8.
104. See id. at 1269a:l.
105. N.E., supra note 20, at 1134b:18-21.
106. St. Thomas Aquinas set forth the classic natural law position that "unjust laws are
necessarily non-laws." He claimed that "[ljaws framed by man are either just or unjust. If they
be just, they have the power of binding in conscience, from the eternal law whence they are
derived." ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA, in 2 BASIC WRITINGS OF SAINT
THOMAS AQUINAS 794 (Anton C. Pegis ed., Random House 1945). Aquinas also cites
Augustine for the proposition that "a law that is not just, seems to be no law at all." Id. at 795
(I-II, Q. 96 A. 4).
107. Cf. Wright, supra note 12, at 686 n.280. Against Heyman's claim that "the
requirements of justice depend on legislation," Wright reads "Aristotle as recognizing
principles of natural justice toward which the political justice of legislation and adjudication
aspires, and as equating the 'common good' of the community with the good of each and every
one of its individual members." Id.
108. Cicero explains:
True law is right reason in agreement with nature; it is of universal application,
unchanging and everlasting.., there will not be different laws at Rome and at Athens, or
different laws now and in the future, but one eternal and unchangeable law will be valid
for all nations and all times, and there will be one master and ruler, that is, God, over us
all, for he is the author of this law, its promulgator, and its enforcing judge.
CICERO, DE REPUBLICA, III, xxii, 33 (emphasis added).
109. N.E., supra note 20, at 1134b:30. When interpreting Aristotle, Aquinas warns us here
that:
we must keep in mind that the essences of changeable things are immutable; hence
whatever is natural to us, so that it belongs to the very nature of man, is not changeable
in any way, for instance that man is an animal. But things that follow a nature, like
dispositions, actions, and movement, are variable in the fewer instances. Likewise those
actions belonging to the very nature of justice cannot be changed in any way, for
example, theft must not be committed because it is an injustice. But those actions that
follow (from the nature of justice) are changeable in a few cases.
ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, 1 COMMENTARY ON THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 444 (C.I. Litzinger
trans., 1964).
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and in a particular application, based on the rational principle of
practical wisdom.
However, although articulating a notion of natural justice and
"absolute justice," Aristotle emphasizes limitations on judges and
magistrates. For example, even though he often emphasizes that
"[t]he goodness or badness, justice or injustice, of laws varies of
necessity with the constitutions of states,"11 he continually limits
judicial discretion to "those matters only on which the laws are
unable to speak with precision owing to the difficulty of any general
principle embracing all particulars.""' He further states that
the rule of the law.., is preferable to that of any individual. On
the same principle, even if it be better for certain individuals to
govern, they should be made only guardians and ministers of the
law. For magistrates there must be-this is admitted; but then
men say that to give authority to any one man when all are
equal is unjust. There may indeed be cases which the law seems
unable to determine, but such cases a man could not determine
either. But the law trains officers for this express purpose, and
appoints them to determine matters which are left undecided by
it, to the best of their judgement. Further, it permits them to
make any amendment of the existing laws which experience
suggests. Therefore he who bids the law rule may be deemed to
bid God and Reason alone rule, but he who bids man rule adds
an element of the beast; for desire is a wild beast, and passion
perverts the minds of rulers, even when they are the best of
men. The law is reason unaffected by desire."'
Moreover, he emphasizes that "[t]he law ought to be supreme over
all, and the magistracies should judge of particulars, and only this
should be considered a constitution." 113
Given these strong statements limiting the role of magistrates and
judges, the role of practical wisdom in determining the position of
equality in adjudication seems to be limited to situations where the
law cannot, because of its generality, sufficiently address the
particulars of a dispute (i.e., fails to meet the requirements of
equity). In other words, the judge determines whether the law meets
110. POL., supra note 60, at 1282b:8-9.
111. Id. at 1282b:3-5. Aristotle continues:
And even now there are magistrates, for example judges, who have authority to decide
some matters which the law is unable to determine, since no one doubts that the law
would command and decide in the best manner whatever it could. But some things can,
and other things cannot, be comprehended under the law, and this is the origin of the
vexed question whether the best law or the best man should rule. For matters of detail
about which men deliberate cannot be included in legislation.
Id. at 1287b:16-23.
112. Id. at 1287a:19-33.
113. Id. at 1292a:33-34.
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the requirements of natural justice in its application to the particulars
of a legal dispute rather than in general (on its face). On this reading,
Aristotle is proposing a very limited notion of judicial restraint.
Although the judge may not make general proclamations
invalidating or creating law in accordance with natural justice, the
judge is the one who interprets the facts and the law. Relying on
practical wisdom, the judge determines whether the general
principles fit the particulars and whether the general principles are
indeterminate, ambiguous, conflicting, or require amendment."4
As noted above, Aristotle argues that determinations involving
both universals (laws) and particulars (facts) require practical
wisdom. He insists that "error in deliberation may be either about
the universal or about the particular; we may fail to know either that
all water that weighs heavy is bad, or that this particular water
weighs heavy." '115 Further, he claims that the fact that
practical wisdom is not scientific knowledge is evident; for it
is... concerned with the ultimate particular fact, which is the
object not of scientific knowledge but of perception-not the
perception of qualities peculiar to one sense but a perception
akin to that by which we perceive that particular figure before
us is a triangle; for it in that direction as well there will be a
limit. But this is rather perception than practical wisdom, though
it is another kind of perception than that of the qualities
peculiar to each sense1"6
Consequently, judging is not merely a deductive process of going
from universals to particulars; it involves a kind of perception (called
the "eye of the soul""' 7) that the particular fact is governed by a
114. When and under what circumstances a judge could determine that an apparently
relevant legislative standard is not applicable depends on an evaluation of the "indeterminacy"
of the law. Kress notes that "[t]he indeterminacy thesis asserts that law does not constrain
judges sufficiently, raising the specter that judicial decision making is often or always
illegitimate." Kress, supra note 97, at 203. He further indicates that
versions of indeterminacy differ according to whether they claim that the court has
complete discretion to achieve any outcome at all (execute the plaintiff who brings suit to
quiet title to his cabin and surrounding property in the Rocky Mountains) or rather has a
limited choice among a few options (hold for defendant or plaintiff within a limited range
of monetary damages or other remedies), or some position in between.
Id. at 201. Aristotle does not provide a theory regarding the amount of indeterminacy in the
law. However, he does appear to recognize at least a moderate amount of indeterminacy
somewhere in between these two extremes in his comments regarding equity as a corrective of
justice. Moreover, his discussion of equity clearly indicates that the judge is the one to
determine if the relevant statutory and common law are indeterminate in some sense (e.g.,
ambiguous, conflicting) in their application to the particulars of the dispute in front of her.
115. N.E., supra note 20, at 1142a:20-22.
116. Id. at 1142a:23-31.
117. Id. at 1144a:29-30. Martha Nussbaum emphasizes that
[a]s Aristotle long ago argued, reasoning in ethics and politics is and ought to be different
from the deductive reasoning some seek in the sciences, for it must be concerned in a
more fundamental way with historical change, with the complexity of actual practical
26
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities, Vol. 12, Iss. 2 [2000], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh/vol12/iss2/2
Modak-Truran
particular universal. In this respect, Aristotle further argues that
"both the first terms and the last are objects of intuitive reason and
not of argument, and the intuitive reason which is presupposed by
demonstrations grasps the unchangeable and first terms, while the
intuitive reason involved in practical reasoning grasps the last and
variable fact, i.e. the minor premise.""' 8 Therefore, to know that a
universal (law) does or does not apply to the particulars (facts) at
issue requires practical wisdom, which includes a perception that the
general does or does not apply to the particular.
As a result, Aristotle's claim that corrective justice requires
practical wisdom means that the law is always held accountable to
natural or absolute justice in its application. If Pericles determines
that the application of a law would be unjust in a particular situation,
then he in effect concludes that the "unjust law is necessarily a non-
law" in its application to that particular case. By contrast, Aristotle's
statements regarding the limitations on magistrates and judges to
questions correcting for deficiencies in the generality of the law
(including amending the law) appear to rule out the possibility of
judges invalidating a law in general or on its face (i.e., for current and
future litigants). That is left for the legislature. Thus, with respect to
the application of the law, the position of equality (the law) is always
subject to the standard of practical wisdom.
In easy cases, the apparently relevant legislative or common law
standard is judged to be applicable, unambiguous, determinate, and
in accordance with equity. In other words, the general principle does
not undermine the purpose of the law under these particular
situations. Even the judge without practical wisdom may achieve the
just result in these cases because the apparent legal rights or pre-
interaction holdings are the same as the position of equality.
However, to really know or determine that this is the just result
contexts, and with the sheer diversity of cases. For all these reasons, though it will
certainly seek and use rules as guides, it will also attend to the details of cases and will
not simply assume in advance that the rule as stated antecedently will be fully adequate
to cover the cases.... Aristotle's norm of practical reason is well exemplified in the
characteristic procedures of the common law, with its rich attention to history and
circumstance.
MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, POETIC JUSTICE: THE LITERARY IMAGINATION AND PUBLIC LIFE
86 (1995). Elsewhere, Nussbaum argues that Aristotle attacks
the insistence that rational choice can be captured in a system of general rules or
principles which can then simply be applied to each new case. Aristotle's defense of the
priority of 'perception,' together with his insistence that practical wisdom cannot be a
systematic science concerned throughout with universal and general principles, is
evidently a defense of the priority of concrete situational judgments of a more informal
and intuitive kind to any such system.
MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, LovE's KNOWLEDGE: ESSAYS ON PHILOSOPHY AND LITERATURE
66 (1990).
118. N.E., supra note 20, at 1143a:35-b:2.
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requires practical wisdom. In addition, in hard cases, the practically
wise judge rules that the apparently relevant legal principles fail to
meet the requirements of natural justice because the law does not fit
the particulars of the case or the law is indeterminate, conflicting, or
requires amendment. Practical wisdom is required to determine the
position of equality that, under those circumstances, is in accordance
with the telos of the good life. Accordingly, in his discussion
corrective justice, Aristotle claims that "the nature of the judge is to
be a sort of animate justice..'.9 In both easy and hard cases, the
position of equality is finally determined by the judge after the fact
by practical wisdom rather than by the apparent legal rights at the
time of the alleged injury. The content of the position of equality
must be consistent with the position of equality that Pericles would
determine in accordance with practical wisdom and the telos of the
good life. In some sense, then, all law is subject to the standard of
practical wisdom in its application.
IV. THE EMPTINESS OF CORRECTIVE JUSTICE
From the preceding discussion, it becomes evident that in one
respect, the critique of corrective justice as empty is accurate. It is
empty in the sense of being formal. However, many interpreters of
corrective justice have inferred from the formal nature of corrective
justice that it lacks any specific content.20 For example, Ernest
Weinrib argues that "the equality that lies at its heart is
unexplained."'' This part will set forth and critique Weinrib's
formalistic interpretation of the content of corrective justice along
with the principalist and political interpretations proposed by
Richard Warner and Steven Heyman. These interpretations of the
content of corrective justice have ignored the role of practical
wisdom and the telos of the good life in determining the content of
corrective justice. In contrast to these positions, I will then argue that
Aristotle sets forth a method for determining the content of the
position of equality rather than specifying the particular nature of
that equality. Corrective justice is not empty in the sense of having
no content because the person of practical wisdom provides its
content by determining the nature of the position of equality in
relation to the particular circumstances and in relation to the good
life in that community. Despite this account of the content of
119. Id. at 1132a:20 (emphasis added).
120. See supra note 15.
121. WEINRIB, PRIVATE LAW, supra note 12, at 57.
122. In some cases, however, there may be a tension between what is required by good
citizenship and what is required by the good life. Aristotle claims that "perhaps it is not the
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corrective justice, however, this part will conclude by identifying an
additional sense in which corrective justice is empty. It proposes a
hypothetical rather than a categorical content for corrective justice.
A. Alternative Proposals for the Content of Corrective Justice
Weinrib argues that Aristotle's conception of corrective justice
provides the formal structure of justification for private law but that
it fails to articulate any specific content for corrective justice.
Nevertheless, he claims that Aristotle's formal equality is not empty
but that "the equality of corrective justice is the abstract equality of
free purposive beings under the Kantian concept of right."'" In other
words, he proposes a Kantian theory of moral agency as the content
for, or exposition of, corrective justice.
Contrary to Aristotle's emphasis on final causation noted above,2 "
Weinrib's formalistic reading of Aristotle reduces the final cause of
corrective justice and the position of equality (the good life) to its
formal cause. Weinrib claims that
[t]he judge's activity in making the transaction conform to its
inherently rational structure operates as an efficient cause that
works its matter into its immanently intelligible shape.
Corrective justice as the formal cause of private law thereby
becomes the dynamic principle that Aristotle termed final cause.
In the identity of formal and final cause, the idea that the
transactions have an internal ordering that expresses their unity
and distinguishes them from distributions becomes decisive in
the actualization of a legal reality.125
This results in a theory of corrective justice with an internal
rationality independent of the telos of the good life. "On this
account, private law cannot be understood in terms of further effects
which it produces or fails to produce."'26
However, the reduction of final to formal causation depends upon
same to be a good man and a good citizen of any state taken at random." N.E., supra note 20,
at 1130b:28. As a result, in a bad state, the judge may promote less virtue by choosing the result
warranted in the best possible state. In that case, the practically wise judge would choose the
position of equality that promotes the most virtue in that less-than-perfect state. In other
words, the nature of corrective justice may be different under different constitutional regimes:
"The goodness or badness, justice or injustice, of laws varies of necessity with the constitutions
of states." POL., supra note 60, at 1282b:9-10. For the purposes of this Article, however, I wish
to avoid this thicket of issues and to set forth an outline of Aristotle's method of determining
the position of equality. Consequently, I will presume that the position of equality in relation
to the good life in the relevant state is the same as the position of equality in relation to the
good life in the best possible state. For further discussion of the tension between being a good
person and a good citizen, see Solum, supra note 78, at 111, 114-22.
123. WEINRIB, PRIVATE LAW, supra note 12, at 58.
124. See supra text accompanying notes 56-68.
125. Weinrib, Aristotle's Forms, supra note 15, at 223.
126. Id. at 224.
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a radical reinterpretation of corrective justice that detaches it from
practical wisdom and the telos of the good life. This allows Weinrib
to interpret Aristotle's teleological notion of corrective justice as
consistent with Kant's deontological concept of abstract right. To
support the separation of corrective justice and practical wisdom,
Weinrib points to Aristotle's claim that corrective justice does not
consider the virtue of the parties involved but only the character of
the gain and loss in relation to the position of equality. 27 In this
respect, Aristotle argues that
it makes no difference whether a good man has defrauded a bad
man or a bad man a good one, nor whether it is a good or a bad
man that has committed adultery; the law looks only to the
distinctive character of the injury, and treats the parties as
equal, if one is in the wrong and the other is being wronged, and
if one inflicted injury and the other has received it. Therefore,
this kind of injustice being an inequality, the judge tries to
equalize it."=
On the basis of this quotation, Weinrib claims that "[t]he
movement of Aristotle's argument is from virtue to a form of justice
congruent with virtue, then to a justice that admits but does not
require virtue [distributive justice], and finally to a justice [corrective
justice] that completely denies virtue's relevance. '129 He further
argues that "[t]he object of Aristotle's ethics generally is to elucidate
the excellences of character that mark proper human functioning"
but that corrective justice "obviously stands apart from Aristotle's
general concerns."'" Consequently, "[b]y ignoring considerations of
worthiness, corrective justice abstracts from the considerations that
pertain to Aristotle's rich and full notion of the good."''
From this analysis, Weinrib concludes that "three ideas come
together in corrective justice: the abstraction from such particulars as
social status and moral character, the equality of the parties, and the
sheer correlativity of doing and suffering."'32 Weinrib argues that
"[o]nly Kant's exposition of the concept of right, aside from
127. See WEINRIB, PRIVATE LAW, supra note 12, at 77-78; Weinrib, Corrective Justice,
supra note 12, at 419; Weinrib, Aristotle's Forms, supra note 15, at 212-13. See also Posner,
supra note 15, at 189-91.
128. N.E., supra note 20, at 1132a:2-7. See also AQUINAS, supra note 106, at 920 (I-II, Q.
104, A. 1) (arguing that judicial precepts do not concern the virtue of men but their relations to
one another).
129. Weinrib, Aristotle's Forms, supra note 15, at 213.
130. WEINRIB, PRIVATE LAW, supra note 12, at 80; Weinrib, Corrective Justice, supra note
12, at 421.
131. WEINRIB, PRIVATE LAW, supra note 12, at 80; Weinrib, Corrective Justice, supra note
12, at 421.
132. WEINRIB, PRIVATE LAW, supra note 12, at 81.
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subsequent treatments that incorporate its insights,"'33 provides an
adequate account of the three ideas that come together in corrective
justice. "Kant understood right as the juridical manifestation of self-
determining agency."'' Consequently, "the equality of corrective
justice" becomes "the abstract equality of free purposive beings
under the Kantian concept of right." '135 In other words, corrective
justice can be articulated in terms of a Kantian theory of moral
agency without reference to practical wisdom and the telos of the
good life. Furthermore, Weinrib maintains that
[t]he differences between the Kantian and the Aristotelian
accounts of private law are expository, not substantive. Kant
treats from the standpoint of self-determining agency what
Aristotle describes as a structure of interaction. With interaction
as his starting point, Aristotle elucidates the other-directedness
of justice and links the parties through the notion of equality.
Kant, in contrast, starts with agency and shows its necessary
embodiment in a juridical order of abstractly equal agents.
Aristotle's account of corrective justice and the Kantian account
of right move over the same ground but from different
directions."3
Weinrib thus proposes a deontological interpretation of corrective
justice that strips it of its status as a moral virtue and thereby
precludes providing content for corrective justice via the exercise of
practical wisdom and the telos of the good life. The internal
perspective of the law is achieved by eliminating the teleological
aspects central to Aristotle's notion of corrective justice and to his
general mode of analysis. Hence, Weinrib's account precludes
providing content for corrective justice because of his radical
reinterpretation of corrective justice as detached, unlike any other
moral virtue, from practical wisdom and the telos of the good life.
Alternatively, Richard Wright claims that corrective justice is not
an empty formalist shell but that "the moral equality of the parties in
corrective justice seems to prefigure (through ethical presuppositions
rather than formalist conceptual implications) Kant's foundational
assumption of the 'absolute moral worth' of each individual. '137
Wright claims that the substantive content of corrective justice is the
absolute moral equality of the parties. He points out that Aristotle
"rejects conceptions of the good that are based on wealth, pleasure,
or enjoyment, which are the values that are to be maximized in
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 58.
136. Id. at 83.
137. Wright, Substantive Corrective Justice, supra note 12, at 702.
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efficiency and utilitarian theories," but then also argues that this
results in "a conception of the good that is intrinsic to the individual
herself: full realization of one's humanity through activity in accord
with a rational principle and in accord with complete virtue over
one's life."1 Consequently, for Wright, Aristotle is a "principalist"
rather than a formalist or a pragmatist; "[h]e believes that there are
fundamental principles of morality and justice, which are reflected
imperfectly in existing law despite its appearance of constant
change.'
39
This principalist account, however, disregards the fundamentally
teleological nature of Aristotle's theory of ethics and the function of
practical wisdom in the determination of the norm of equality. By
following a Kantian or deontological mode of interpretation, Wright
appears to be reducing Aristotle's four-fold notion of causation to
efficient causation. Rather than interpreting corrective justice in
terms of its final or most comprehensive cause (what it is for the sake
of-i.e., the good life), he attempts to explain the content of
corrective justice via a form of self-legislation (efficient causation).
The conception of the good is defined in terms of the individual's
"activity in accord with a rational principle and in accord with
complete virtue over one's life.""' ° Furthermore, the telos of the good
life is not a state of affairs promoting human flourishing that should
be pursued but is reduced to "the good for each and every citizen of
the state"'' or an absolute moral equality of the parties. This
interpretation of corrective justice is similar to Kant's attempt to
explain morality as an act of self-legislation so that morality, the
realm of human freedom, would be explained by law-like regularities
analogous to those of science that explain the phenomenal realm of
efficient causation.
In addition, note that Wright's interpretation of the content of
corrective justice as an abstract moral equality is more akin to the
theoretical mathematical theorems (theoretical reason) that
Aristotle sharply distinguishes from the practical wisdom (practical
reason) that is required for determining the position of equality and
the mean of all the moral virtues. In this respect, Aristotle claims
that
while young men become geometricians and mathematicians
and wise in matters like these, it is thought that a young man of
practical wisdom cannot be found. The cause is that such
138. Id. at 701.
139. Id. at 686.
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wisdom is concerned not only with universals but with
particulars, which become familiar from experience, but a young
man has no experience, for it is length of time that gives
experience.' 2
Also, recall that the "intuitive reason which is presupposed by
demonstrations grasps the unchangeable and first terms, while the
intuitive reason involved in practical reasoning grasps the last and
variable fact, i.e. the minor premise."'' 3 As a result, practical wisdom
involves a kind of perception or "animate justice," rather than
merely deduction or demonstration, leading to the just result. By
contrast, Wright maintains that practical wisdom does not aid in the
determination of the position of equality but merely entails "[t]he
proper application of the fundamental principles to a particular
situation.""' Thus, Wright's Kantian interpretation of the content of
corrective justice does violence not only to Aristotle's teleological
mode of explanation but also to his robust notion of practical
wisdom.
By contrast, Steven Heyman concurs with the teleological
conception of corrective justice that "only the judge displays the
virtue of particular justice [corrective justice].'' 4 He argues that
Weinrib fails to recognize that Aristotle's account of corrective
justice is simply one part of his account of the nature of virtue in
general. However, rather than articulating the content of corrective
justice via practical wisdom and the telos of the good life, Heyman
claims that "Aristotle's doctrine of juridical equality reasonably can
be understood based on a conception of freedom" developed in
Aristotle's Politics."' Although basing his view on an Aristotelian,
rather than a Kantian, notion of freedom, Heyman agrees with
Weinrib that the mean of equality is a "juridical equality" based on a
conception of freedom. He criticizes Weinrib's reliance on an
apolitical Kantian notion of freedom as an equality of autonomous
individuals in abstraction from their particular characteristics and
circumstances. Corrective justice is community-based or political;
"relations of justice are always mediated by the law and institutions
of the polis, which are oriented toward the common good."147
142. N.E., supra note 20, at 1142a:11-16. Aristotle claims that "a boy [someone young in
experience] may become a mathematician, but not a philosopher or a physicist" because "the
objects of mathematics exist by abstraction, while the first principles of these other subjects
come from experience" and "because young men have no conviction about the latter but
merely use the proper language." Id. at 1142a:16-20.
143. Id. at 1143a:35-b:2.
144. Wright, Substantive Corrective Justice, supra note 12, at 687.
145. Heyman, supra note 12, at 858.
146. Id. at 862.
147. Id. at 856.
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Consequently, he argues that "[t]he ultimate basis of juridical
equality is the equality of citizenship,"' " which means that free and
equal citizens have an "equal share in ruling and being ruled." '49 The
judge then applies the principles of arithmetical equality enacted by
those who have equal citizenship in the political community and who
ought to be guided by practical wisdom (legislative wisdom).
Furthermore, like Wright, Heyman appears to be suggesting that
corrective justice in adjudication results for the most part from the
application of principles. However, unlike Wright, he claims that
these principles are the result of legislation by free and equal citizens
(guided by practical wisdom) in a political community rather than
natural principles of an absolute moral equality of the parties that
equate "the 'common good' of the community with the good of each
and every one of its individual members. 150
In addition, Heyman quotes Aristotle's statement that "'the laws
in their enactments on all subjects aim at the common advantage...
so that in one sense we call those acts just that tend to produce and
preserve happiness and its components for the political
community....""' However, although judges do apply legislative
enactments that are ideally guided by practical wisdom, the practical
wisdom involved in adjudication requires an interpretation of those
enactments. Do they apply to this case? Is this case an exception?
Does the ambiguity or indeterminacy in the statute require the judge
to use practical wisdom to determine the position of equality (i.e.,
are these hard cases?)? In other words, laws cannot definitively
demarcate their application.52 The judge must interpret: 1) whether
the law is applicable factually and legally; 2) whether the law is
ambiguous or indeterminate; and 3) whether the law meets the
requirements of natural justice in its application (i.e., equity-the
corrective of justice). 53 Contrary to Heyman's emphasis on the
148. Id. at 862.
149. Id. at 863.
150. Wright, Substantive Corrective Justice, supra note 12, at 686 n.280.
151. Heyman, supra note 12, at 853 (quoting N.E., supra note 20, at 1129b:13-19).
152. Jurgen Habermas notes that "legal hermeneutics has the merit of having revived the
Aristotelian insight that no rule is able to regulate its own application." JURGEN HABERMAS,
BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW AND
DEMOCRACY 199 (William Rehg trans., MIT Press 1996) (1992). For further discussion of
Habermas's discourse theory of law, see Mark Modak-Truran, Habermas's Discourse Theory
of Law and the Relationship Between Law and Religion, 26 CAP. U. L. REV. 461 (1997).
153. Another way to reinforce the distinction between legislative and judicial reasoning is
to remember that one of the judge's roles is to evaluate whether the legislative enactments
meet with the requirements of natural justice, not merely legal justice, in their application to
the particulars of the case. In other words, if the position of equality dictated by legislation is
merely a matter of legal justice (not in accordance with natural justice), the judge may override
that determination based on the practically wise position of equality warranted by particulars
of that case (i.e., in accordance with natural justice). Judicial reasoning thus acts as a check on
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superiority of legislative wisdom,' the legislative or common law
definition of the position of equality is further subject to the standard
of practical wisdom in its application to the particulars of a case.
Therefore, the practically wise judge may invalidate the apparently
relevant legislative or common law definition of the position of
equality in its application to a particular case based on the rational
principle of practical wisdom.
Consequently, legislative wisdom, a type of practical wisdom, is
different from the practical wisdom exercised in judicial contexts
involving corrective justice.'55 Legislative wisdom involves aiming at
the common good in general for the future while judicial practical
wisdom involves determining the position of equality applicable to
the particular facts of the case before the court. In easy cases,
Heyman's emphasis on legislative determination of the position of
equality would not be problematic; the position of equality
established by judicial practical wisdom would be the same as the
legislative determination. However, in hard cases, the role of
practical wisdom becomes more evident and pronounced. In that
case, Heyman's reliance on Aristotle's political conception of
freedom as the content of the position of equality seems to break
down. If the political conception of equality is precisely what is
indeterminate, ambiguous, or in need of amendment (i.e.,
inequitable), then the judge must determine that political conception
for the case at hand. Although Heyman recognizes that the
conception of equity constitutes an exception to the superiority of
legislative reasoning to ensure that statutes meet the requirements of natural justice in their
application.
154. See Heyman, supra note 12, at 856 n.41. Heyman's emphasis here on the superiority of
legislative wisdom appears to be in part due to Aristotle's comments in the Rhetoric that
enacted laws "should themselves define all the points they possibly can and leave as few as may
be to the decision of the judges." ARISTOTLE, RHETORIC 1354a:32-34 (W. Rhys Roberts
trans.), in 2 THE COMPLETE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE, supra note 20, at 2152 [hereinafter
RHETORIC]. See also Heyman, supra note 12, at 856. However, the translator of the Rhetoric
makes clear that Aristotle's reference to judges here is a broad one that includes "jurymen"
and others who judge. In fact, Aristotle's "weightiest reason of all" for this claim is that
members of the assembly and the jury... will often have allowed themselves to be so
much influenced by feelings of friendship or hatred or self-interest that they lose any
clear vision of the truth and have their judgement obscured by considerations of personal
pleasure or pain. In general, then, the judge should, we say, be allowed to decide as few
things as possible.
RHETORIC, supra, at 1354b:6-12. This discussion of judges, however, appears to run contrary to
the discussion of "the judge" (usually in the singular) in Aristotle's discussion of corrective
justice in the Nicomachean Ethics. In the latter context, Aristotle claims that "when people
dispute, they take refuge in the judge; and to go to the judge is to go to justice; for the nature of
the judge is to be a sort of animate justice.' N.E., supra note 20, at 1132a:20-21. As a result,
Heyman's claim that the position of equality is in general determined by legislatively enacted
law seems to run counter to Aristotle's understanding of the fuller role of judicial wisdom in
the determination of the position of equality as specified in the Nicomachean Ethics.
155. See N.E., supra note 20, at 1141b:23-33.
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legislative reason, he claims that "[t]he exception is only apparent,
however, because the role of the judge in this instance is 'to say what
the legislator himself would have said had he been present, and
would have put into his law if he had known.""56 This recognizes the
final unity of the determination of justice via legislative wisdom and
the determination of justice via judicial wisdom, but it ignores the
importance of the supremacy of practical wisdom with respect to the
determination of corrective justice in the application of the law. As
Wright argues, "Heyman apparently reads Aristotle as making the
requirements of justice depend on legislation." '157 Conversely, while
the legislator and the judge both aim at the telos of the good life, the
practically wise judge has the final say regarding the applicability of
the apparently relevant legislative provision.
B. Corrective Justice as a Method of Determining the Position of
Equality
Contrary to these interpretations, Aristotle's notion of corrective
justice does not receive content from a formal, substantive, or
political conception of equality or freedom. Although Aristotle's
notions of corrective justice and its mean of equality are formal, they
receive content, as with all moral virtues, through agents (judges)
exercising the intellectual virtue of phronesis or practical wisdom and
in relation to the telos of the good life. The formal statement of
corrective justice and the position of equality are thus saved from
emptiness by phronesis, or practical wisdom.'58 As a result, this
means that the practically wise judge determines the position of
equality in relation to the telos of the good life and that her
determination of the position of equality takes precedence over any
formal, substantive, or political (legislative) conceptions of equality
in the application of the law to the particulars of a dispute.
This teleological reading of corrective justice rejects the Kantian or
deontological readings of corrective justice by Weinrib and Wright.
Like Heyman's, this interpretation of corrective justice emphasizes
the contextual nature of the position of equality in its relation to a
particular political community. However, on the teleological
interpretation, the position of equality is not definitively determined
by citizens who have an "equal share in ruling and being ruled" (by
legislative enactment) but is finally determined by the judge in
156. Heyman, supra note 12, at 856 n.41 (quoting N.E., supra note 20, at 1137b:23-24).
157. Wright, Substantive Corrective Justice, supra note 12, at 686 n.280.
158. See KRAUT, supra note 43, at 327 ("And to understand the proper place of this virtue
of thought [phronesis], we must see how Book VI of the NE saves Aristotle's earlier
statements about the mean from emptiness.").
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accordance with practical wisdom and the telos of the good life. In
easy cases, the position of equality (the mean in accordance with the
understanding of the person of practical wisdom) will be the same as
the pre-interaction holdings of the parties (possibly determined by
legislative enactment) and will be evident even to judges without
practical wisdom. In hard cases, only the judge with practical wisdom
will be able to determine the position of equality in accordance with
the telos of the good life. Consequently, contra Wright, the position
of equality is not a pre-determined or unchanging principle that
merely needs to be applied in accordance with the intellectual virtue
of practical wisdom. In other words, Aristotle's notion of corrective
justice must be related to the fundamentally teleological character of
his thought rather than read through a Kantian deontological lens,
whether principalist (Wright) or formalist (Weinrib). Thus, Aristotle
gives us a method for determining the content of the position of
equality that provides a teleological basis for resolving legal disputes.
C. The Hypothetical Content of Corrective Justice
In one additional sense, however, corrective justice may be
considered empty in that it proposes a hypothetical, rather than a
categorical, norm of equality.159  Despite Aristotle's formal
description of corrective justice, we may ask Aristotle: What is the
rational principle or right rule by which the practically wise person
chooses to act? To this question, Aristotle only responds that "that
which appears to the good man is thought to be so. '""° The person of
practical wisdom or the good person is "the measure of each
thing.'' Aristotle's inductive approach ends by relying upon the
common consensus of the community for a principle of the good and
for a definition of the practically wise human (i.e., the person leading
the political life). The community can point to practically wise
people like Pericles, but Aristotle does not give the principle by
which they are thus determined to be so."
According to Aristotle the intellectual virtue of practical wisdom
and the moral virtue necessary for it are the result of being trained
159. Hypothetical imperatives dictate actions that are only a means to something else. See
KANT, supra note 19, at 82. If one assumes a certain state of affairs (ends) should be pursued,
then certain actions (means) follow. For example, if we assume the good life is living like
Pericles, then certain actions follow. However, Kant argues that the "supreme principle of
morality" must be categorical; it must be necessary for all rational beings. Id. at 56-60.
160. N.E., supra note 20, at 1176a:15.17; see also ACKRiLL, supra note 84, at 31 (arguing
that Aristotle does "not begin to reveal any principle or test whereby the man of practical
wisdom can decide what is the noble or the right thing to do").
161. N.E., supra note 20, at 1176a:17.
162. See GAMWELL, supra note 19, at 26 (arguing that, in Aristotle's ethics, "[v]irtuous
activity is identified through appeal to the activity of virtuous people").
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by good laws and good people. They depend upon the right
upbringing and a good state. In this respect, Alasdair Maclntyre
points out that
[t]he list of virtues in the Ethics is not a list resting on Aristotle's
own personal choices and evaluations. It reflects what Aristotle
takes to be "the code of a gentleman" in contemporary Greek
society. Aristotle himself endorses this code. Just as in analyzing
political constitutions he treats Greek society as normative, so in
explaining the virtues he treats upper-class Greek life as
normative.163
In other words, authority and not reason is the basis of Aristotle's
definition of the good life and the mean of each moral virtue like the
position of equality. In summarizing his discussion of judgment and
"sympathetic judges" (those able to discriminate the equitable
correctly), Aristotle even states that "we ought to attend to the
undemonstrated sayings and opinions of experienced and older
people or people of practical wisdom not less than to
demonstrations; for because experience had given them an eye they
see aright."'" Thus, Aristotle assumes or points to what is good and
proposes a hypothetical rather than a categorical imperative.
This analysis appears to set up a tension between Aristotle's claims
about natural justice as something universally applicable and the
contextual and authoritarian definition of the position of equality
(rational principle) required for determining corrective justice.
Recall that moral virtue "is a state of character concerned with
choice, lying in a mean, i.e. the mean relative to us, this being
determined by a rational principle, and by that principle by which
the man of practical wisdom would determine it.""16 Moral virtue
compels us to aim at the right end while practical wisdom
(intellectual virtue or the practical thought of a good person)
compels us to choose the right means. Why would Aristotle say that
the mean is "determined by a rational principle" if this were not the
case? However, if the mean is a rational principle, why did he qualify
his notion of rational principle by stating it was "that principle by
which the man of practical wisdom would determine it"? If this
principle can be known by reason alone, his last phrase would be
redundant. But if it is redundant, why doesn't Aristotle tell us what
that rational principle is? Instead he uses this phrase and relies on
163. ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, A SHORT HISTORY OF ETHics 67 (1966).
164. N.E., supra note 20, at 1143b:10-13. See also JONSEN & TOULMIN, supra note 101, at
66 (arguing that "people of experience 'know them [paradigmatic cases] when they see
them').
165. N.E., supra note 20, at 1106b:36-1107a:2.
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practical wisdom to determine the mean in the particular
circumstances of human action and in relation to the good life. For
example, in Aristotle's discussion of the relationship between
pleasure and the good, he claims that whether "the perfect and
supremely happy man has one or more activities, the pleasures that
perfect these will be said in the strict sense to be pleasures proper to
man.,,166
Although resolving this debate is beyond the scope of this Article,
one could argue that the rational principle informing corrective
justice (i.e., the position of equality) is a form of natural justice,
universally true but changing, and known or perceived by persons
with practical wisdom in the context of a particular dispute. The
content of the rational principle changes because natural justice
changes. Thus, the person of practical wisdom will be able to identify
the position of equality that is in accordance with natural justice for
the particular circumstances of the case, but the content of corrective
justice and the position of equality cannot be definitively identified
by a substantive rational principle beforehand.
This conclusion, however, still leaves us with the question of how
the person of practical wisdom identifies this rational principle. As
indicated above, Aristotle does refer to practical wisdom as a kind of
perception of ultimate fact and the judge as "animate justice." Those
with practical wisdom have an "eye" that enables them to see that
the particular facts should be governed by a particular law. However,
what if two perceptions of the rational principle by "people of
experience" differ? Both people of experience "know" what they see
is true, but how can their perceptions be debated or evaluated if they
are "objects of intuitive reason and not of argument"?167 It is thus in
this sense that Aristotle identifies the content of the moral virtues
only hypothetically. He would resolve this dispute by pointing to the
practically wise result, but he could resolve the dispute this way only
if we presume that he is practically wise himself. Aristotle thus fails
to provide us with a way of identifying who is practically wise or with
a way of knowing the rational principle in and of itself. Rather, he
points to the person of practical wisdom in Greek society-
Pericles -without categorically specifying the nature or principle
that identifies him.
V. THE ROLE OF PRACTICAL WISDOM IN HARD CASES
Finally, to better understand Aristotle's method of determining
166. Id. at 1176a:27-29.
167. Id. at 1143a:36.
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the content of the position of equality, this part explores how
Pericles would evaluate certain hard cases involving nuisance law."~
As emphasized above, practical wisdom plays a role in judging both
easy and hard cases. The role of practical wisdom in easy cases is not
as pronounced as in hard cases because the position of equality in
those cases correlates with the parties' apparent legal rights.69 For
example, the law of battery in most jurisdictions provides that you
can recover from someone who intentionally hits you, which is the
same result dictated by practical wisdom. These cases include those
where the apparently relevant statutes, common law principles,
contracts, or constitutional law provisions at issue do not clearly
resolve the dispute. Many theorists now refer to this broadly as legal
indeterminacy. 7 ° Further, in some cases, the legal definition of the
position of equality conflicts with the practically wise definition. In
all these cases, Pericles must define or redefine the legal definition of
the position of equality as part of his adjudication of the case.
A. General Issues
Before discussing actual cases, there are several general issues to
address. First, I am not attempting to show that the teleological
conception of corrective justice describes the actual reasoning of
judges in the following cases or private law adjudication in general.
The purpose of this part is not descriptive but demonstrative. It
attempts to further aid in explaining how Pericles, the practically
wise judge, would reason about these particular disputes. I thus
chose the cases that I discuss because their outcomes were practically
wise but not necessarily because the judges in these cases were
practically wise. For example, in some of these hard cases, the judge
may have arrived at the practically wise result but by a different
168. Any reference to rights in this Article is not meant to imply that Aristotle had or
would adopt a modem liberal theory of rights. In other words, Aristotle would not agree with
Hobbes, the founder of modem liberalism, who claimed that the state could only be explained
scientifically or in non-teleological terms. In that respect, Hobbes claimed that the strongest
human passion was the fear of violent death, which translated into the right of self-
preservation. See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 91-92 (Richard Tuck ed., Cambridge Univ.
Press 1991). Given this most basic human passion, the only reason humans would create a state
would be to enhance their self-preservation, which is the purpose for all rights. See generally
LEO STRAUSS, NATURAL RIGHT AND HISTORY 120-251 (1953). Strauss argues that "[d]eath
takes the place of the telos." Id. at 181. To the contrary, the discussion here is merely trying to
explain modem cases, which adopt rights language (and probably to some extent the theory),
in terms of Aristotle's notion of corrective justice. Thus, on occasion, I make analogies
between the position of equality and legal rights. However, this is for explanatory purposes and
not to suggest that Aristotle is advocating a modem liberal theory of rights.
169. Cf. Weinrib, Corrective Justice, supra note 12, at 408 (arguing that "the holdings of the
parties immediately prior to their interaction provide the baseline from which the gain and
losses are computed").
170. For a more thorough discussion of the issue of legal indeterminacy, see Kress, supra
note 97, at 200-15.
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method and for different reasons. For instance, when the primary
goods involved are economic goods, the practically wise result may
be similar to the result dictated by the economic analysis of law. This
does not mean that corrective justice is reducible to the economic
analysis of law. Rather, it shows that in the absence of other
overriding non-economic goods (e.g., aesthetic use and enjoyment of
property) or that all else being equal, practical wisdom and the telos
of the good life dictate the efficient allocation of economic goods.
In addition, despite the similar outcomes, these different
approaches can reach the same conclusion for different reasons.71
Recall that Pericles aims at the right end or the good life because he
is morally virtuous, and he chooses the right means to that end or the
position of equality because he is practically wise. Further recall that
practical wisdom is like perception rather than scientific
demonstration so that the judge's decision would not have the
technical character of a cost-benefit analysis. In other words, Pericles
determines the position of equality in relation to the particulars of
the case and the telos of the good life, which is the highest good
surrounding all other goods. He must determine how the proposed
position of equality contributes to the good life. For instance, one
position of equality may maximize the efficient allocation of
resources but minimally aid in promoting the moral virtue of citizens.
Another position of equality may maximally aid in promoting the
moral virtue of citizens but may lead to the inefficient allocation of
resources. Pericles would then have to determine which of these
positions of equality contributes most to the good life, which
surrounds the good of efficiency and the good of a morally virtuous
citizenry. By contrast, the economic analysis of law aims at
maximizing efficiency, rather than the good life, and uses technical
reason, rather than perception, to calculate which outcome achieves
this objective. According to Aristotle, the judge aiming mainly at
efficiency would be revealing a deficiency of character or moral
virtue by failing to aim at the good life, which is the highest good
compelled by moral virtue. Moreover, even though a judge
employing economic analysis may happen to arrive at the just result
in some cases, Aristotle claims that moral virtue is required to arrive
at the just result in all cases. Without moral virtue, the judge will not
171. See CASS SuNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING AND POLITICAL CONFLICr 37 (1996).
Sunstein argues that law is basically comprised of "incompletely theorized agreements on
particular outcomes, accompanied by agreements on the narrow or low-level principles that
account for them." Id. This allows for substantial disagreement on more general theoretical
principles that attempt to explain and legitimize the law. Consequently, "people may agree on
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be aiming at the right end so that at least in some cases, the judge
will inevitably err. Also, even if aiming at the right end, this judge
will lack practical wisdom to choose the proper means to achieve
that end. Arriving at the same result by a different process of
reasoning, therefore, does not prove that judicial decision making
does not require moral virtue. It merely shows that in some cases,
judges may arrive at the just result even if they take a different
approach and even if they are not morally virtuous. Finally, this
cursory treatment of a few nuisance cases cannot empirically
demonstrate Aristotle's claim that sound judicial decision making
requires moral virtue. These examples merely serve to help
demonstrate the more theoretical discussion above.
In addition, in order to bracket the issue of how the judge knows
the rational principle informing practical wisdom, the following
discussion will presume that we have some knowledge of who is
practically wise and that we can describe how a practically wise judge
would decide these cases. This presumption will allow us to see how
the practically wise judge functions in concrete cases even though we
still have not resolved precisely how the changing content of the
position of equality (the rational principle) is determined by the
judge. Furthermore, in concrete cases, the number of relevant goods
to be evaluated is often much more limited than the fuller
description of practical decision making presented above. As a
result, Aristotle's insights into the formal process or framework of
legal adjudication are somewhat easier to conceptualize.
B. Nuisance Law
Black's Law Dictionary defines nuisance as "that activity which
arises from unreasonable, unwarranted or unlawful use by a person
of his own property, working obstruction or injury to right of
another, or to the public, and producing such material annoyance,
inconvenience and discomfort that law will presume resulting
damage.... In other words, a nuisance results from property owners
using their property in a way to harm other property owners. For
example, in Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co.,173 the dirt, smoke and
vibrations emanating from a cement plant were held to constitute a
nuisance to the surrounding property owners. Determining whether
a property owner is harmed, however, depends on the judge's
determination that the position of equality entails that the property
owner has a right to the use and enjoyment of his property free from
the invasion in question. The judge must then adjudicate these
172. BLACK'S LAW DIcTIONARY 1065 (6th ed. 1990).
173. 257 N.E.2d 870 (N.Y. 1970).
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incompatible property uses by determining what the position of
equality ought to be in that case. For example, if A buys a house near
an airport or a pig farm, the judge must determine whether A has the
right to claim that he is injured by B's use of her land for an airport
(noise and air pollution) or a pig farm (air pollution and aesthetic
concerns). In this respect, the common law recognizes the live and let
live rule"' and the locality rule.'75 Also, the common law recognizes
that as a city expands, its boundaries will naturally impinge upon
areas once reserved for other purposes like farming and animal
husbandry. At some point, these users will no longer be entitled to
use their land for the same purposes because the residential use
becomes a higher valued use to the community.'76 However, the law
does not or cannot specify precisely when these principles should be
applied and is unable to specify rules that will cover all situations. In
other words, when one good (property right) outweighs another
(property right) is a matter of judicial discretion. There is no
scientific formula or computer program for deciding cases. Thus, in
the case of incompatible land uses in changing societies, the judge, as
a representative of the community, must decide after the fact what
the appropriate equal position should have been. Only then can she
assess any gains or losses. As a result, only the practically wise judge
(Pericles) will be able to calculate what the just use of the land is
with respect to the changing nature of the society and with respect to
the good of the society (i.e., the good life) in all cases.
For example, in Spur Industries v. Del E. Webb Development
Co.,'77 a retirement community was built on cheap land in the
country near a cattle feed lot. At first, the feed lot did not present a
problem. As the retirement community grew, the feed lot became
offensive to the new portions of the retirement community and
interfered with continued development desired by other retirees.
174. See Bamford v. Turnley, 122 Eng. Rep. 27, 32-33 (1862) (holding that "those acts
necessary for the common and ordinary use and occupation of land and houses may be done, if
conveniently done, without submitting those who do them to an action... [which is] a rule of
give and take, live and let live").
175. See Campbell v. Seaman, 63 N.Y. 568, 577 (1876) (noting that "use of property in one
locality and under some circumstances may be lawful and reasonable, which, under other
circumstances, would be unlawful, unreasonable and a nuisance"); see also Sturges v.
Bridgman, 11 Ch. D. 852, 865 (1879) (finding that "it would result in the most serious practical
inconveniences, for a man might go-say into the midst of the tanneries of Bermondsey, or
into any other locality devoted to a particular trade or manufacture of a noisy or unsavoury
character, and, by building a private residence upon a vacant piece of land, put a stop to such
trade or manufacture altogether").
176. See, e.g., Pendoley v. Ferreira, 187 N.E.2d 142 (Mass. 1963) (enjoining a piggery
because the rural community had become predominantly residential); Ensign v. Walls, 34
N.W.2d 549 (Mich. 1948) (enjoining a business of raising St. Bernard dogs because city
expansion converted the area to residential use).
177. 494 P.2d 700 (Ariz. 1972).
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The developer sued to enjoin the feed lot operations. The court
issued an injunction against the cattle feed lot but forced the plaintiff
to indemnify the defendant for reasonable moving or shutting down
costs.'78
However, the court required Spur "to move not because of any
wrongdoing on the part of Spur, but because of a proper and
legitimate regard of the courts for the rights and interests of the
public."'79 The court noted that Spur's predecessors in interest had
started the feedlot several years before the retirement community
development started and that they could not have foreseen that "a
new city would spring up, full-blown, alongside the feeding operation
and that the developer of that city would ask the court to order Spur
to move because of the new city."'" Further, the court noted that the
developers attempted to develop additional areas up to five hundred
feet from the Spur feedlot until the sales resistance and complaints
by the purchasers made further development unfeasible.
Consequently, the court found that the developer, Del Webb, was
"entitled to relief prayed for (a permanent injunction), not because
Webb is blameless, but because of the damage to the people who
have been encouraged to purchase homes in Sun City.. 8 In other
words, the continued operation of the Spur feedlot would have
decreased the ability of those who had purchased homes in the
retirement community to use and enjoy their land. Thus, the effect
on these third parties justified enjoining the feedlot as a public
nuisance.
Despite this injunction (the usual outcome of a successful nuisance
action), the court would have overlooked the harm to Spur and
rewarded immoral behavior by the developers if it did not indemnify
Spur. The developers could have easily chosen another rural location
without a feedlot or chosen to develop the community away from,
rather than towards, the feedlot. The developers intentionally
developed land closer to the feedlot. They thought they could take
advantage of the cheap land near the feedlot and then use the legal
system to improve the land. In addition, merely enjoining Spur
would also have encouraged others in the future to engage in activity
for their own economic benefit without regard to the good of the
178. See id. at 708. But cf, Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870 (N.Y. 1970)
(reasoning that a residential community was substantially harmed by cement making
operations but granting permanent damages to compensate for the total economic loss to the
residents' property rather than an injunction because the total damage to plaintiffs' properties
was relatively small in comparison with the deleterious economic consequences of shutting
down the cement making operations).
179. Spur, 494 P.2d at 708.
180. Id. at 707.
181. Id. at 708.
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community. Developers of a new city should not be able to force out
those using rural land for purposes that are usually considered
beneficial to the community. If the city had naturally grown to the
location of the feedlot, the good of the community would be to use
the land for residential purposes. By contrast, if someone creates a
city in a rural area where a feedlot already exists, she would be
imposing a harm on the feedlot owner if she could enjoin the feedlot
activity. In other words, even though the feedlot operations harmed
those living in the retirement community, Webb also harmed Spur by
developing land that would foreseeably interfere with Spur's feedlot
activities. Therefore, the court's remedy rectified both harms. First,
the court rectified the harm to residents of the retirement
community by enjoining the feedlot. In addition, the court rectified
the harm to Spur by requiring Webb to indemnify Spur for the cost
of moving or shutting down. Thus, by rectifying both of these harms,
the court determined the practically wise position of equality, which
was not evident from the existing law.
A new rural revolution has similarly resulted in conflicting land
uses between massive corporate factory hog farms and other rural
residents and presents another situation that helps illustrate how
Pericles would use practical wisdom to determine the position of
equality in a hard case. These massive factory farms concentrate hog
production in an unprecedented manner." For example, one family
in Mfinnesota had to cease running a daycare operation, keep their
doors and windows shut in the summer, and spend some nights in a
motel when the noxious fumes became too overwhelming.'83 In
addition to overpowering and prolonged noxious fumes that often
cause people to stay indoors, these corporate hog farms have
resulted in: 1) detrimental health effects (increased tension and
depression, headaches, nausea, dizziness, fatigue, sore throats,
vomiting, shallow breathing, sleep disturbances, and loss of
appetite); 2) poisoning of wells and surface water with parasites,
bacteria, and viruses; 3) considerable death of aquatic life from feces
and urine floods escaping waste lagoons; 4) huge concentrations of
flies swarming and breeding around waste lagoons; and 5) increased
illegal dumping of thousands of gallons of waste into public waters."
By contrast, the smaller traditional hog farm operations spread hog
182. See Michael Satchell, Hog Heaven-and Hell, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Jan. 22,
1996, at 55; see also Nancy Millnan, Livestock Law Could Be Hogtied, CHI. TRIB., July 7, 1997,
sec. 4, at 1; Nancy Millman, Going Hog Wild Down on the Farm, CHI. TRIB., July 6, 1997, sec.
5, at 1; Wes Smith, Huge Hog Farms Drawing Squeals from Neighbors, CHI. TmRI., Aug. 22,
1996, sec. 1, at 1.
183. See Satchell, supra note 182, at 59.
184. See id. at 55-59.
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waste relatively evenly and thinly over the landscape, allowing it to
absorb gradually. Although traditional hog farms emit some fumes
that invade their neighbors' property, their intensity and magnitude
are substantially lower than those emitted by factory farms. These
factory farms thus dramatically change the type and magnitude of
interference with competing land uses and substantially decrease the
value of surrounding properties.
States booming with new corporate factory farms such as North
Carolina, however, often have only minimal environmental and
zoning regulations for big hog operations. s5 For example, North
Carolina statutory law only provides for minimal setback
requirements."a However, it also limits the common law right to
bring nuisance suits against agricultural or forestry operations"8 and
strives to minimize the regulatory burden on animal waste systems. l"
The current statutory law in these states thus apparently sets forth
land use regulations that allow these factory farms to operate in close
proximity to non-farm residences and other agricultural operations.
Consequently, the apparent legal rights allow factory farms to
impose substantial amounts of air and water pollution burdens on
their neighbors, which diminish, and in some cases destroy, the use
and enjoyment of their land.
However, although compliance with land use regulations arguably
provides a defense against nuisance claims, it does not preempt these
185. For an overview of the current regulation of hog farming, see Matt M. Dummermuth,
Note, A Summary and Analysis of Laws Regulating the Production of Iowa's and Other Major
Pork Producing States, 2 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 447 (1997); John D. Bums, Comment, The Eight
Million Little Pigs-A Cautionary Tale: Statutory and Regulatory Responses to Concentrated
Hog Farming, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 851 (1996).
186. N.C. GEN. STAT. §106-803 (1998) (North Carolina's "Swine Farm Siting Act"
provides that "[a] swine house or a lagoon that is a component of a swine farm shall be located:
(1) At least 1,500 feet from any occupied residence. (2) At least 2,500 feet from any school;
hospital; church .... (3) At least 500 feet from any property boundary. (4) At least 500 feet
from any well supplying water to a public water system .... (5) At least 500 feet from any
other well that supplies water for human consumption."). Cf. 510 ILL. COMP. STAT. 77/35
(1996) (providing for minimal setback requirements for livestock management facilities or
waste handling facilities serving between 50 and 1,000 animal units ("4 mile from the nearest
occupied non-farm residence and h mile from the nearest populated area"), but increasing
these setback requirements depending on the size and location of these facilities).
187. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §106-701 (1998) ("right to farm" law providing that "[n]o
agricultural or forestry operation or any of its appurtenances shall be or become a nuisance,
private or public, by any changed conditions in or about the locality thereof after the same has
been in operation for more than one year, when such operation was not a nuisance at the time
the operation began"). However, this provision does not allow an agricultural or forestry
operation to make fundamental changes to the nature of their operations after one year and
then to argue that nuisance claims are barred without giving potential claimants one year from
that change in activity to bring a nuisance claim. See Durham v. Britt, 451 S.E.2d 1 (N.C. 1994).
188. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §143-215.10A (1998) (establishing for farms with 250 or more
swine "a permitting program for animal waste management systems that will protect water
quality and promote innovative systems and practices while minimizing the regulatory
burden").
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claims."s If a nuisance suit were filed, a practically wise judge would
not consider compliance with land use regulations as a complete
defense against nuisance claims."l She would have to determine
whether these land use regulations adequately protected others from
the factory farm's air and water pollution in their application to a
particular case. In other words, she would determine if these
regulations were sufficient to protect others from a nuisance under
the particular circumstances of the case. If not, there would be a
conflict between the permitted use allowed by these land use
regulations and the common law nuisance standard, which she could
resolve by holding that the factory farm constituted a public or
private nuisance. In accordance with this holding, she could remedy
this situation in several ways. First, she could simply enjoin the
factory farm operations (the usual remedy for a nuisance claim). A
practically wise judge, however, could determine a more nuanced
position of equality to accommodate these competing land uses. As
in Spur,'91 the court could enjoin the factory farm operations if the
land owners deleteriously affected by the factory hog farm
indemnified the factory for the costs of shutting down and relocating.
Alternatively, if as in Boomerse the total damage to plaintiffs'
properties was relatively small in comparison with the deleterious
economic consequences of shutting down the factory farm, the judge
could allow the factory farm to continue its operations but require
the factory farm to pay permanent damages equal to the total
189. In general, permissive regulation has been held not to bar a plaintiff's suit for a
nuisance. See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON & A. DAN TARLOCK, LAND-USE CONTROLS: CASES
AND MATERIALS 588 (1981); see also, e.g., Morgan County Concrete Co. v. Tanner, 374 So. 2d
1344 (Ala. 1979) (ruling that the operation of a concrete plant in compliance with zoning and
environmental regulations did not preclude finding liability for a nuisance). Some states,
including California, have adopted specific statutes providing that nothing done under
statutory authority can be deemed a nuisance. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3482 (West 1999).
However, in California, judges have narrowly construed this statute and thus have preserved
the viability of nuisance suits. See, e.g., Greater Westchester Homeowners Ass'n v. City of Los
Angeles, 603 Pa. 2d 1329 (Cal. 1979) (awarding damages to neighbors of an airport because the
particularized inquiry into the statute did not reveal a legislative intent to sanction a nuisance);
Suzuki v. City of Los Angeles, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d 880 (Cal. App. 1996) (ruling that a valid use
permit expressly allowing use does not prevent a nuisance abatement action if business
operations are injurious to persons working and living in the area).
190. See, e.g., Bormann v. Board of Supervisors, 584 N.W.2d 309,321 (Iowa 1998) (holding
that a statutory provision exempting an area designated as an "agricultural area" from
nuisance suits constituted "a taking of private property for public use without the payment of
just compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment to the Federal Constitution"); Parker
v. Barefoot, 502 S.E.2d 42, 48 (N.C. Ct. App. 1998) (granting a new trial because jury
instructions failed to instruct "the jury that they could still find defendants liable for
substantially and unreasonably interfering with plaintiffs' use and enjoyment of their property
even if they concluded that defendants' hog farm was designed and operated in conformance
with federal regulations and that it was the most technologically advanced, state-of-the-art hog
farm that defendants could have constructed").
191. See supra text accompanying notes 177-78.
192. See supra note 178.
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damage to the land owners affected by the nuisance. Moreover, any
of these three remedies would equalize the burdens imposed by
factory farms on surrounding property owners and would discourage
future factory farms from strategically buying small parcels of land
and imposing the burdens described above on surrounding property
owners.
Furthermore, note that these remedies would entail reliance upon
the Aristotelian method, which provides for the primacy of judicial
practical wisdom over legislative practical wisdom. In other words,
these remedies result from Pericles's determination that the land use
regulations are not sufficient to protect property owners in this
particular case. Although not claiming that natural justice invalidates
these land use regulations in general, Pericles would maintain that
these regulations did not meet the requirements of natural justice in
their application to the particulars of this case. Thus, as in all hard
cases, the position of equality would be determined by practical
wisdom in adjudication, and Pericles's judicial practical wisdom
would take precedence over legislative practical wisdom with respect
to the final determination of the position of equality in relation to
the telos of the good life.
CONCLUSION
According to the teleological account of corrective justice,
corrective justice is a moral virtue of the judge that allows the judge
to know what the position of equality (legal rights) should be in
every case. Aristotle's conception of corrective justice specifies a
method of judicial decision making whereby only the practically wise
(i.e., morally virtuous) judge can know the content of corrective
justice and its relation to the telos of the good life in all cases.
Contrary to interpretations of corrective justice as a formal
(Weinrib), substantive (Wright), or political (Heyman) conception of
equality or freedom, the teleological conception maintains that
judging requires moral virtue rather than technical, philosophical, or
legal expertise. Corrective justice and its mean of equality receive
content, as all moral virtues do, through judges' exercise of the
intellectual virtue of practical wisdom. Pericles, the ideal Aristotelian
judge, determines the position of equality in terms of the telos of the
good life, and he considers the relevant ends of the competing moral
virtues and of the other goods in relation to the particular
circumstances of the injury. In easy cases, Pericles finds that the
apparently relevant legal principles are in accordance with the
position of equality. Even judges without practical wisdom will be
able to achieve the just result in these cases. However, in hard cases,
296
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Pericles determines that the apparently relevant legal principles do
not fit the particular facts or that the law is indeterminate,
ambiguous, or conflicting (i.e., the law fails to meet the requirements
of natural justice in its application). In these cases, the just result
depends on the practical wisdom of the judge. Pericles, the
practically wise judge, relies on the position of equality dictated by
the telos of the good life to resolve the dispute. As a result,
Aristotle's claim that corrective justice requires practical wisdom
means that the law is always held accountable to what he refers to as
"natural or absolute justice" in its application. If Pericles determines
that the application of a law would be not be just (i.e., not practically
wise) in a particular situation, then he in effect concludes that the
"unjust law is necessarily a non-law" in its application to that
particular case. Consequently, all laws are subjected to the standard
of practical wisdom in the process of their application, and the legal
definition of the position of equality must be consistent with the
position of equality that Pericles would determine in accordance with
the telos of the good life and the particular facts of the case. Thus, all
legal principles are subjected to the standard of practical wisdom in
the process of their application, and the content of the position of
equality must be consistent with the position of equality that Pericles
would determine in accordance with practical wisdom and the telos
of the good life.
Aristotle's account of corrective justice, however, may be
considered empty in one sense. Aristotle proposes a hypothetical,
rather than a categorical, norm of equality. When pushed to explain
how the person of practical wisdom determines the position of
equality, Aristotle only points to the person of practical wisdom in
Greek society (Pericles) as normative. He does not categorically
specify the nature or principle that identifies such person. Despite
Aristotle's hypothetical definition of the good life and the moral
virtues, his account of corrective justice gives us great insight into the
method of judicial determination of the position of equality. It
enlightens us by stressing the necessity of moral virtue for judges to
be able to determine the just outcome in all cases. Moral virtue is
necessary because it compels the judge to aim at the right end (the
good life) and practical wisdom is necessary because it compels the
judge to choose the proper means for achieving that end. This
account also indicates that the judicial determination of the position
of equality or the process of judicial interpretation should always
occur in relation to the particulars of the dispute and the telos of the
good life. Thus, we may readily challenge Aristotle's aristocratic
definition of the good life and the moral virtues (including corrective
justice), but his theory of corrective justice still makes a valuable
20001
49
Modak-Truran: Corrective Justice and the Revival of Judicial Virtue
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2000
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities [Vol. 12:249
contribution to our understanding of the process of legal
adjudication and supports a "Revival of Judicial Virtue."
Finally, with some extrapolation from the preceding discussion, the
teleological conception of Aristotle's theory of corrective justice can
reconcile the allegedly incompatible ex post analysis of most
corrective justice theories with the ex ante economic analysis of law.
If one understands how corrective justice gets its content, then
corrective justice does initially have an ex post focus by taking the
apparent legal rights as a starting point. However, judges must then
evaluate these apparent legal rights. This evaluation is a matter of
practical wisdom that requires judges to evaluate the apparent legal
rights from the standpoint of the position of equality that promotes
the telos of the good life, ex ante. In other words, rather than
providing a deontological alternative to a utilitarian economic
analysis, the teleological conception of corrective justice unifies a
deontological (ex post) and teleological (ex ante) focus. In easy
cases, the law operates in only an ex post manner. The practically
wise judge determines that the apparent legal rights are in
accordance with the position of equality dictated by the telos of the
good life. By contrast, in hard cases, the practically wise judge
determines that the apparent legal rights are contrary to the position
of equality required by the telos of the good life for the particular
circumstances of that case. Thus, in accordance with the telos of the
good life (natural justice), corrective justice requires that the
apparent legal rights be modified in their application to particulars of
the case. Further, while promoting the good life is an ex ante,
teleological analysis, it is not synonymous with economic analysis.
Economic factors are certainly relevant to understanding the good
life, but so are promoting friendship, prudence, magnanimity, and
the other virtues. Consequently, the teleological conception of
corrective justice provides for a possible reconciliation of the ex post
perspective of most theories of corrective justice and the ex ante
perspective of the economic analysis of law without reducing the
human good to the norm of efficiency.
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